Friday, November 23, 2018

Can we talk about whiteness?

As many readers may know, some of the authors of this blog are law students in the course, “Working Class Whites and the Law.” I have gotten some interesting reactions from people – both those in the legal field and those not – when I tell them I’m in this class. My law student friends have reactions ranging from “How is that class?” with a tone of genuine interest to “How is that class?” with at tone that implies that they expect me to say it’s uncomfortable. The essence of the reaction from my non-legal friends, on the other hand, has been a look of surprise and a question about what on earth we study in the course.

Even more uncomfortably, I got a question about the class in a job interview. On my transcript, this class shows up as “Working Class White.” The interviewer told me that at first he thought that “White” must be the professor’s name, but then he realized that wasn’t right. “Is that actually the name of the class?” he asked me. I attempted to explain the content of the course, but I hadn’t been expecting an interviewer to ask me about the course with such a tone of disbelief, so I was flustered and didn’t do the best job.

It seems that, regardless of the prevalent discussion of working-class whites in the media during election cycles (see this article and this one and this one and this review of another article), our society isn’t comfortable with the idea of academic studies of working-class whites.

Why is this? It could perhaps be because Americans generally aren’t comfortable talking about class. I think it might be more because we aren’t comfortable talking about whiteness.

I was expecting some pushback on this class, but I was expecting it from those who are involved in critical race studies of other races. I thought that there might be the perception that studying whiteness was a perpetuation of privileging whiteness in academic settings. The reactions I’ve gotten, however, haven’t much alleged that issue.

The issue seems to be that a law class called “Working Class Whites and the Law” makes whiteness visible. Several scholars have written about how a part of the system of white supremacy is that whiteness becomes the default. While other races are "seen," whiteness and white culture are taken for granted and become “invisible.”  (See, for example, Critical White Studies (Delgado & Stefancic, eds. 1997)). Making the subject of study in our course explicit necessarily abridges that invisibility, and I think this is what makes people uncomfortable.

This is, in my opinion, a good thing. If even the title of the class on my transcript has the effect of making race visible and disrupting the courses of white privilege, that’s a positive outcome from the course. But selfishly, I wish there were a way to accomplish those objectives with me having to explain in an interview, “Yes, that really is the name of a course I’m taking.”

Wednesday, November 21, 2018

Stare decisis and equal protection

I attended the lunchtime talk of the 2018 U. C. Davis Law Review Symposium “Bakke at 40.” The subject of the symposium was a review of affirmative action in higher education over the 40 years since the germinal affirmative action case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke was decided. One of the outcomes of that case was to hold that universities may only consider race explicitly in their admissions (that is, they may only have affirmative action policies) when the purpose of those policies is to ensure the diversity of the classroom. This can be a contentious issue, especially for working-class whites who experience the disadvantages of class in a way that greatly weakens the ways in which they experience race privilege

I was especially caught by what Michal Kurlaender, Professor of Education Policy, had to say about the social science research that has been done about the effects of diversity on education and the interactions between race and education outcomes. At the time that Bakke was argued, Kurlaender said, social scientists had very little data to show that diversity does indeed have an effect on education. Since Bakke, however, a significant body of research has been developed. Studies now show the educational benefits of many types of diversity. Additionally, social science has shown significant differences in educational outcomes correlated to race, strongly suggesting that remediating past and current discrimination should be a compelling state interest that justifies the use of race.  (The Court has judged remedying the effects of discrimination not to be a compelling state interest except where there was de jure past discrimination in a district which has not reached unitary status.)

Furthermore, research has also shown that “race-neutral alternatives” such as the Texas ten percent plan, although better than nothing, are not as effective at increasing racial diversity as race-conscious policies. Using class instead of race can have positive outcomes but also is not a wholly satisfactory replacement for racially conscious admissions decisions. The effects of race and the effects of class are complex, and though they may interact, neither one can fully address all of the issues covered by the other. (For a few examples of race privilege not related to class, see the list in Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack by Peggy McIntosh.)

What do we do when research shows that the equal protection decisions which were made in the past were made on the basis of incomplete or inaccurate information? The point of equal protection is to treat like things alike. The research now shows that like people are not being treated alike in education; the disparities in outcomes on the basis of race show that systematic, and ongoing discrimination still operates to disadvantage non-whites. It seems that we should revisit some of the earlier decisions and reconsider, now that we have new information, whether remedial action for past and current discrimination can be considered a compelling state interest.

This, of course, runs counter to another legal principle: stare decisis. Once a court has made a rule, that rule is to be applied to all similar cases which come before the court. Interestingly, stare decisis is also designed to uphold the principle that like things should be treated alike. Its purpose is to ensure consistency over time. It seems unjust, however, to continue to perpetuate past decisions made using incomplete information which do not equally protect classes. It is futile to pursue justice by treating like situations alike across time when that precedent does not treat like persons alike across contemporaneous groups.

Would working-class white people be willing to accept that? It would probably be hard. Working-class white people may see stare decisis as protecting their interests in this situation. Perhaps underscoring the ways in which the principle of fairness between groups (equal protection) is similar to the principle of fairness across time (stare decisis) can help justify such a decision to constituencies who might feel threatened by such a change. Also important is to apply both fairness principles to all groups, requiring fairness also for those disadvantaged by class.

Tuesday, November 20, 2018

What does the Camp Fire and its aftermath reveal about white privilege?

I can't help wondering, as I read the New York Times latest story on the Camp Fire's total destruction of Paradise, California, what good the "whiteness" of the vast majority of survivors is doing them.  Are we, the voyeurs consuming news about the tragedy such as that proffered up by "In a Walmart Lot, a Rough Refuge for Fire Evacuees," seeing the refugees/evacuees/survivors (what word should I use?) of the fire with more or less compassion because the vast majority of them (indeed, all I have seen visually depicted in the many media sources I have consumed) are apparently (non-Hispanic) white?

These days, we hear a great deal about white privilege, white supremacy (not only as a far-right ideology but as a phenomenon, what some students in our class have suggested is a synonym for white privilege or racism generally), whites, and whiteness in the news media, and amidst the chattering classes generally.  Our heightened preoccupation with race in the Trump era has caused mainstream/left-leaning media to express whiteness and make it an explicit component of analysis.  Just a few examples are David Brooks' "The Rich White Civil War," David Leonhardt's "The Senate:  Affirmative Action for White People," and Thomas Edsall's "Who's Afraid of a White Minority?"  (I am certain I could find better illustrations of my point if I took a lot more time to track them down, but I'll let these suffice for now, given that this is just a blog post, not (yet) a law review article! or book chapter).  My point is this:  Critical race scholars have long complained (appropriately, in my opinion) about whiteness being "transparent," meaning that whiteness is an unspoken racial default.  If no race is specified, white or whiteness is assumed.  This is an aspect of what Peggy McIntosh calls the invisible knapsack of white privilege.

Scholars--including me--have been increasingly resisting and defying this transparency by calling out whiteness, by naming it, making whiteness an explicit axis of analysis, including in the context of intersectionality (i.e., what is at the intersection of white-skin privilege and socioeconomic disadvantage?).  Some of my illustrative work is here, here and here. Another fabulous example, this one by Prof. Camille Gear Rich, is here.  Increasingly, especially in the aftermath of the 2016 election, journalists and pundits--especially in the mainstream media and on/from the left--are centering race in their analysis of many phenomena, including phenomena that would not previously have been seen as "raced."  I think the Brooks and Leonhardt pieces at the links above are pretty good examples of that, though Brooks also focuses on class ("rich") and Leonhardt could well focus on rurality in lieu of whiteness when complaining about the disproportionate power Senators from red states.  So, if we are going center race (as opposed to centering ability, gender, class, sexuality or ...) and not permit whiteness to be transparent, we're going to see the words "white" and "whiteness" in a lot more headlines and news coverage.  That's the trend I've observed.

That brings me back to the Camp Fire and its aftermath:  All of the folks I have seen photographed or featured in media coverage as evacuees/refugees from the Camp Fire area appear to be (non-Hispanic) white.  This is consistent with the demographics of Paradise, California (87.1% white alone; 7% Hispanic or Latino; 1.5% Native American; 1.2% Asian; 0.1% African American), and Butte County more generally (which is a bit more diverse72.1% white alone; 16.4% Hispanic or Latino; 2.5% Native American; African American, 1.8%).  Yet these evacuees don't look privileged, and that appearance is not only because they've just survived a wildfire with little but the clothes on their backs.  In fact, they look largely like the population associated with rural-ish/nonmetro places:  disproportionately elderly, low-income and/or low-education, people with disabilities, veterans.  Interestingly, 14.1% of Paradise residents live below the poverty line, compared to 19.5% of those in Butte County. (A former student who lives in Chico told me this summer that the city has in recent years been a magnet for homeless people because it is known to be a generous, charitable community; I have no idea if this is borne out by hard data, but the higher poverty rate in Butte County than in Paradise seems consistent with that proposition).

Some of the folks featured in Simon Romeo's New York Times report are representative:  They include financially precarious whites, including veterans (more than 10% of Paradise residents) and (from other journalists' reports) the elderly (more than 25% of Paradise residents were over the age of 65) and people with disabilities (18.9%).  (More links to coverage of the fire's aftermath, touching on lack of housing and illness, among other issues, are embedded here). Indeed, many news reports have referred to Paradise as a "retirement community" because it had attracted as residents so many elderly folks on fixed incomes looking for reasonably priced places to live, including in the Pine Springs mobile home park that burned to the ground in record time.  Here's some further economic context from/for Simon Romero's NYTimes depiction of those displaced by the Camp Fire:
California is the richest state in the country, home to technology giants like Google and Facebook and the multimillionaires who lost luxury homes around Malibu to wildfires this month. But the blazes are also laying bare the economic inequality that distinguishes the state, as shallow-pocketed survivors grasp for the kinds of ad hoc strategies commonly seen after disasters in the developing world.  (emphasis added)
Romero provides several profiles of evacuees.  One is of a 39-year-old former Marine, Jarrad Winter, "who recently emerged from a stretch of homelessness, only to lose everything" in the fire.  Winter comments,
I never thought I’d live in a tent city... I mean, this is America; we’re not supposed to live this way. But here we are, man, the new normal.
Another is Anjeanette Ramey, age 30, who had worked in customer service previously but was unemployed at the time of the fire.  Romero quotes Ramey:
We were always a paycheck-to-paycheck kind of town. ... All I made it out with were the clothes on my back ... My house, my car, gone. No money, no job. I have no idea what happens next. 
Her boyfriend’s reaction was more about suspicion and anger. He declined to give his name, saying he didn’t want to be known as a victim, and said the couple was avoiding formal shelters because he thought they were unsafe for people like him and his neighbors, who he thought counted for little with the rich and powerful.
A 65-year-old man, James Reed, is a retired tow-truck driver who points to his 1968 Chevrolet El Camino, commenting,  “This is my home now,"  Reed had bought his house in Magalia, a community near Paradise, just two years ago.  He commented for Romero's story,
[B]eing here, in this parking lot, I’m reminded I’m not the only one.
Another profile of an evacuee of the Camp Fire is from a prior NYT story, an 89-year-old woman named Patty Sanders who "barely escap[ed] the mobile home community where for years she has subsisted on a $900 Social Security check."  (Another story of an elderly mobile home survivor is here).  More affluent (if only slightly)--or perhaps just luckier--are the evacuees depicted in this feature, who seem to have found friends or family with whom they can stay in nearby Chico.

And then there are those previously homeless in Chico who have joined the tent city outside the Chico Walmart.  They were mentioned in a local NPR story a few days ago, and they also get a mention in this recent Sacramento Bee piece:
There have been rumors that some homeless people have moved in and taken over, but those in the camp say while there might be a handful, they are not the majority. 
“There’s a few of them, and they live down there,” said fire survivor Tim Howell, pointing to a row of tents near the freeway. “We call that skid row.” 
“The come up here and go through the stuff,” said his friend, Christian Walters, pointing to a tent filled with donated goods. “We call them ‘day walkers.’”
So I wonder if it would be helpful to mention the whiteness of these vulnerable, down-and-out  refugee/evacuee/survivor/victims rather than let the accompanying photos permit the reader to observe what is apparent.  To mention the whiteness and make a point of analysis would at least implicitly resist the conflation of whiteness with affluence, agency, autonomy (which I contrast with Professor Trina Jones point that blackness gets conflated with dependency).

The only instance I can think of where the whiteness of a "victim class" (for lack of a better term; I'm open to suggestions) has been explicitly named in reporting is on deaths of despair which, at least early on, were disproportionately occurring among middle-aged, low-education whites (Read more here (see embedded links, too) here, here, here, and here).  Should we talk about the disproportionate whiteness of the victims of the Camp Fire? or will that just perpetuate the stereotype that rural folks are disproportionately white?  or might doing so call attention to the fact that many whites are in economically precarious situations, completely ill-equipped to bounce back from a natural disaster like the Camp Fire?

Remember this Forbes Magazine story from a few years ago about the 63% of folks, unmodified/unraced, who don't have the savings/liquidity to cover an unexpected $500 expense?  We could think of them as the precariat--and on some level don't "we" see it as their own damned fault that their situation is so precarious?

Another issue should be noted, another question asked:  When we look at photos of (mostly) white refugee/evacuee/survivor/victims of the Camp Fire, do we see them any differently than we saw the (mostly) black refugee/evacuee/survivor/victims of Hurricane Katrina more than a decade ago?  I'd argue that many (or most) of us do not view them differently based on their skin color.  That was part of my core argument in Welfare Queens and White Trash:  most Americans have little tolerance for the poor and/or economically precarious.   As long as the victims/survivors/refugees are the type camped out in a Walmart parking lot rather than staying with friends or able to cash their insurance checks and stay in a motel or some other temporary housing, it's their own damned fault.  Aren't the former at some point assessed as "white trash" or hard living, and the latter assessed as settled working class, even upright, striving middle class.  Maybe "we" (the average or typical person) feels some short-term pity, but does that evolve into long-term empathy for the struggle facing these folks in the months ahead?  Whatever the views of observers, I'm not convinced they vary much depending on the race/ethnicity of the refugee/survivor/victim/evacuee.

Let me end by saying that we can never know with certainty the answer to the question I have posed in my "headline." More precisely, we are unlikely to be in agreement about what the Camp Fire, its aftermath, and media coverage of it reveal about whiteness.  Nor are we likely to reach consensus  regarding how the media should cover racial angles/components of the huge story that is the Camp Fire.  Should they, for example, try to find some Latinx or Native American refugees/evacuees/survivors/victims to profile (I saw a profile of a survivor with a Latinx name, Villanueva, for the first time on Nov. 21). so we know that not everyone suffering is white? Should they mention the whiteness of the vast majority of the refugees/evacuees, survivors/victims?  or just let the photos convey that fact?  Would the latter helpful or important because it defies stereotypes of whiteness as affluent and autonomous?  even whiteness as invincible, as reflected in the adage, "you're white, you'll be alright."

I look forward to hearing others' thoughts on the questions I am raising here.

Monday, November 19, 2018

On upward mobility, the "American Dream"--and China?

The New York Times today reveals a fact that will shock many:  One has a greater prospect of upward mobility in China than in the United States.  This finding (which I'll not scrutinize here in terms of methodology; I'm hardly qualified to do so) flies in the face our cultural assumptions--not only about capitalism v. socialism/communism, but also more strictly about the United States v. China. Here's the gist of the article:
There are two 18-year-olds, one in China, the other in the United States, both poor and short on prospects. You have to pick the one with the better chance at upward mobility. 
Which would you choose? 
Not long ago, the answer might have seemed simple. The “American Dream,” after all, had long promised a pathway to a better life for anyone who worked hard. 
But the answer today is startling: China has risen so quickly that your chances of improving your station in life there vastly exceed those in the United States.
Journalists Javier C. Hernandez and Quoctrung Bui report on the reasons for this surprising conclusion, attributing China's primacy to "an economic expansion without precedent in modern history": 
Eight hundred million people have risen out of poverty. That’s two and a half times the population of the United States.
* * * 
Not only are incomes drastically rising within families, but sons are outearning their fathers. That means expectations are rising, too, especially among China’s growing middle class. 
Life expectancy has also soared.
That brings me to a topic I have explored on these pages (and on Legal Ruralism) in prior posts, such as here, here, here, here, here and here, which is deaths of despair and the the role of optimism--or in the case of the United States pessimism--and mobility (is it upward or is it downward?)  in relation to health and wellbeing.  See more here, including references to the work of Andrew Cherlin of Johns Hopkins University, who has theorized white despair in relation to, well, (among other characteristics) whiteness and the current lack of optimism among the white working class, who no longer expect to move up, but instead see themselves slipping backwards. 

Tuesday, October 30, 2018

The real reason Trump won: Misogyny

In an attempt to make sense of the current state of the democracy, Former President Barak Obama returned to the political spotlight in full force last month and made this comment about the current administration:
It’s not conservative. It sure isn’t normal. It’s radical.
(Watch the full speech here). It has been 648 days, 6 hours, and 28 minutes (but who’s counting?) of this circus that is the current political climate and, unfortunately, things are only getting stranger. Take, for example, Trump’s outlandish suggestion that he can abolish the existing right to citizenship for children born in the United States to undocumented immigrants. Clearly, our current president has not read the Constitution. This truly bothersome when recalling that Trump’s predecessor was a Harvard educated professor of constitutional law. So, where did our country go wrong?

The media likes to blame the outcome of the recent election on the Democrats’ loss of the white-working-class ("WWC"). The former President, however, disagrees:
You know, this whole notion that has sprung up recently about Democrats need to choose between trying to appeal to the white working class voters, or voters of color, and women and LGBT Americans, that’s nonsense. I don’t buy that. I got votes from every demographic. We won by reaching out to everybody and competing everywhere and by fighting for every vote.
If Obama is right, where does that put commenters like Esdall and Teixeira who fervently claim the lack of appeal to working-class whites is where Democrats went wrong? Maybe our former President is too optimistic or simply denounces identity politics, or even wants to build coalitions so this has to be part of his "party line." Whatever his angle, however, he is technically correct—the last administration’s strategy of appealing to all voters was successful for two terms. So, where did the Democrats go wrong?

Ruy Teixeira, senior fellow at the Center for American Progress, suggests that the Democrats’ failure to appeal to the forgotten American underclass was the primary issue. The Atlantic opined that fear of societal change and immigration policies motivated the WWC to support Trump. Senator Tom Cotton blames the loss of WWC voters on the media’s criticism of Trump’s WWC-esque characteristics (like eating McDonalds). I don’t buy it. Rather, I think the WWC’s support of Trump (and the Republican Party in general) is revenge based. To them, Hillary represented a liberal, highly educated, New York dwelling, feminist elite. Could the WWC get behind a Black president so long as he goes to church and has a family in the traditional sense? Yes. But a powerful, pantsuit donning woman? Absolutely not. Simply, the white-working-class and America in general was not ready for a female commander in chief.

But don’t take my word for it. From what I have gathered through notable WWC scholars such as Matthew Schmitz and Joan C. Williams, the WWC support traditional family values: e.g., where men are the bread winners and women are the caregivers. Clearly, Hillary is a threat to these values. Although she is married in the biblical sense (i.e., to a man), her marriage has been anything but traditional. And, in my opinion, running for president 8 years after her husband’s term is the most feminist revenge on Bill (for his infidelities) that Hill could procure. Not to mention she was appointed Secretary of State following her tenure as first lady and made a political name for herself separate from her husband.

Yet, Hillary’s successes are often used against her. As feminist legal scholar Joan C. Williams comments:
Hillary Clinton […] epitomizes the dorky arrogance and smugness of the professional elite. The dorkiness: the pantsuits. The arrogance: the email server. The smugness: the basket of deplorables. Worse, her mere presence rubs it in that even women from her class can treat working-class men with disrespect. Look at how she condescends to Trump as unfit to hold the office of the presidency and dismisses his supporters as racist, sexist, homophobic, or xenophobic.
Just like that we are back to subjectively judging women based on their clothes. Hillary’s affinity for pantsuits, common practice use of a personal server, and criticisms of Trump are powerful moves which would all be justified—if only she were a man. Yet, the fact that she is a woman puts a certain spin on otherwise neutral factors. How is challenging Trump’s fitness for office “condescending” yet calling Hillary a “nasty woman” is not? It is clear that this country’s problems with sex, gender, and male-female relations are worsening, and I believe they played a much larger role in the recent election than many think.

A perspective on immigration and the white working class

President Donald Trump has often offered rhetoric opposing immigration and calling for a tightening of laws against immigration to the United States of America. Most recently, Trump has escalated his attacks on a migrant caravan originating in Central America and making its way through Mexico  towards the United States. Trump has declared the situation a national emergency and insisted that "criminals and unknown Middle Easterners are mixed in." Reports from journalists familiar with the caravan have concluded that Trump's assertion is not substantiated by any evidence, and that the caravan consists of families wishing to escape violence and turmoil in Honduras and Nicaragua.

The call for a tightening of immigration laws may be a tactic by Trump to stoke fear and anger in his voting base before the upcoming November midterm elections. Regardless of Trump's tactics, however dubious they may be, the issue of immigration may explain more about the current plight of the white working class (WWC) than found at fist glance. In a recent interview, (that can be found here) Marisa Abrajano, a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, posits a theory that the WWC may feel three distinct threats to their livelihood. First, a cultural threat, exemplified by a commentator saying "if you don't speak english and don't contribute, get out." Second, an economic threat, outlined by fear of joblessness and the familiar idea that immigrants are "stealing jobs" from the ordinary WWC citizen. Third, a political threat, which can be explained as the difficulty in comprehending policies that pose a threat to the WWC and to the country regarding immigration.

The threats perceived by the WWC are not without merit, but may be overstated through politcal rhetoric. A changing culture may create fear of loss and security to all classes and racial groups alike. The New York Times article "Trump's 'Purple' Family Values" helps to explain this commonly perceived threat. Many of the WWC identify closely with their family values and see change and interruption as a threat. Cultural identities are deeply rooted in generations of family values and religion. Immigrants arrive with differing religious beliefs and values, but should not be seen as an outright threat to the WWC as some rhetoric may suggest. In many respects, this is opportunity to learn through diversity and to create growth throughout the country. The fact of the matter is that legal immigrants will continue to come to the United States and change the cultural makeup of all areas in the country. This may be a fear to some, but should be put into perspective that culture evolves continuously and can be beneficial rather than threatening.

The threat of economic woes may be more precarious. Economists have long supported immigration and offered evidence that immigration often boosts native-born Americans up the economic ladder. Immigrant workers often contribute to the lowest rungs of jobs on the economic latter, and provide opportunity for upward mobility to current working class citizens. The economic reality is that immigration boosts supply in the work force with new unskilled laborers who can create growth in many markets as the labor force. Additionally, immigrant workers increase demand in the economy because they become consumers that American workers can turn into customers. This is not to say the some in the WWC may lose jobs to immigrant unskilled laborers. Although, the current economic climate does little to justify such fears. The United States boasts some of the lowest unemployment rates in history. Is it possible that an immigration fueled economic threat is largely a political and rhetorical tactic to divide the voting population rather than to disseminate factual information to voters? I am sure arguments can be made for either side, but the WWC appears to be the most susceptible voting group to perceive this as a real if not already present threat to their livelihood, regardless of evidence to support this threat.

The political threat to the WWC may be the most pronounced in today's media and voting trends. With a partisan government, the Republican party has clearly been responding more to the plight of the WWC voter when concerns regarding immigration arise. The Republicans are able to capture the multiple factors and threats affecting the WWC, build a centralized theme around those factors and mobilize voters to their side. Examples include the "build a wall" movement, and the consistent rhetoric regarding "boarder security." The Democratic party, although dominating the vote of minority groups in the United States, have failed to create a centralized theme that can bring voters together, especially when concerning the WWC voter and immigration.

This partisan divide has only further opened the Democratic and Republican fissure on the issue of immigration. The recent news story of an Iowan murder victim and her family from a WWC background quickly spread because the assailant was an immigrant. Some conservative voices on social media quickly latched on to this story. They created a spectacle around immigration and boasted white nationalist ideals. The victim's family called for a stop to the media comments, saying in an interview:
Our family has been blessed to be surrounded by love, friendship, and support throughout this entire ordeal by friends from all different nations and races. Commenters do not get use use this to inaccurately promote your 'permanently separated' hyperbole.
Furthermore, the article expounds that in a highly rural and working class community, the unemployment rate is only 2.5% and "it would be hard to argue that immigrants were 'stealing' native-born American's jobs. The problem of low, stagnant wages is one Trump has yet to address."

It is widely evident that the WWC and many outside the top 20% are experiencing wage stagnation. This economic woe may explain some of the fear of immigrant fueled economic threat. Still, correlation between immigration and the economic woes of the WWC are largely unsubstantiated, and have often been proven to the contrary by economists. Studies have shown that immigrants actually have lower crime rates than native-born citizens. This could suggest that Trump and his rhetoric may be useful only to stoke fear in the hearts of the WWC to vote Republican. Regardless of Trump's tactics, the Democrats have done a poor job of sending the WWC a comprehensive and centralized message regarding immigration and to put some of the perceived threats of immigration at ease. Although the WWC is struggling to earn a decent wage, the rhetoric regarding immigrants and immigration policy will likely not solve any of their economic woes. Let us hope future policies, whether Democrat or Republican, will address the WWC and the need for wage growth, rather than polarize and divide the voting population.



Trying to win working class white voters in the California midterm elections

Since the Presidential election in 2016, much has been written about what motivates the working-class white voter. One line of argument is that those who voted for Trump were propelled by economic frustration or, relatedly, by the economic impacts of deindustrialization and the resulting social decay and despair. On the other hand, some have argued that white Americans voted for Trump because they feel threatened by the advances made by racial minorities and are anxious that they will lose their place in this country. Or perhaps it’s a culture war between the liberal coasts and the rest of America. The midterm elections offer the first major opportunity to test those theories. After all the ink spilled and all the theories advanced, what strategies are candidates using to attract working-class white voters?

In testing these theories, one particular California race has caught my attention: the race for the U.S. Congressional Representative from California’s 10th Congressional District. The District is centered on the city of Modesto and includes Manteca, Tracy, and Turlock. Ninety-one percent of the land area of the District is rural according to the U.S. Census Bureau. This is one of the most hotly contested races in the nation, and it is one of the the races predicted to affect which party controls Congress after the midterms.

The 10th District has a substantial number of working-class white voters. The 10th District is 74% white (one race), according to the Census Bureau. Given that the Census Bureau asks separately about race and ethnicity and 44% of the 10th District is Hispanic or Latinx, the percent of the population which is “white – not Hispanic or Latinx” is likely somewhat less than 74% but would still constitute the dominant racial group. Moreover, most of the District is working-class. Eighty-two percent of the population of the 10th District over the age of 25 holds less than a bachelor’s degree, which is one important standard for being working class. Another way class is defined is by income. There is less consensus about what income level makes one working-class, with the upper bound seemingly set somewhere between $50,000 and $100,000. In the 10th District, this would capture between 40% (income $50,000 or less) and 71% ($100,000 or less) of the population. The median household income is $63,223.

How are the candidates of the 10th District attempting to win these working-class majority-white voters? Jeff Denham (R, incumbent) and Josh Harder (D) have engaged in fairly extensive television ad campaigns. The ads mention big political issues, such as abortion, healthcare, and trade, but there is more going on. As several articles have noted, including one in the Modesto Bee, one of the biggest points debated in these ads is whether Harder is truly “from here.” While I was unable to find most of the ads online, this anti-Harder video by the Congressional Leadership Fund contains many of the key points: Harder is a “Bay Area liberal” with “San Francisco values.” Denham repeats these concepts in ad after ad; in fact, I just saw a new one last night. Harder responds with ads which highlight the fact that he grew up in the 10th District (unfortunately, I couldn’t find these online) and depict him as pro-Central Valley, out on the campaign trail among the walnut trees.

It seems that, at least as Denham and Harder see it, the most important issue to white working-class voters is that their representative understands them, that he or she is “one of us.” Harder and Denham’s ads mention but don’t dwell on economic frustration, and they don’t touch on race. They seem focused on the culture war: is Harder on the Valley’s side of the war, or is he a liberal coastal invader trying to “steal our Congressional seat”? (That’s a quote from a Denham ad I saw but couldn’t find online.)

Of course, given the unique political geography of California, the fact that Harder and Denham focus on the culture war over other factors may not reflect the country as a whole. But these two candidates are so convinced of the importance of this issue that they’re spending a significant portion of their ad money (this is reportedly a $6 million race) trying to establish who is on which side of the culture war.

UPDATE: For those of you who are interested, Harder won by the very slim margin of 50.9% to 49.1%

Thursday, October 25, 2018

"Sparse country" at Harvard as derision of rurality and conflation with whiteness

Prof. Jeannie Suk Gersen writes in the New Yorker this week under the headline, "At Trial, Harvard's Asian Problem and a Preference for White Students from Sparse Country."  She is writing about the same landmark affirmative action case I wrote about a few days ago here.  And, as I predicted in that post would soon happen among commentators, Professor Gersen conflates rurality with whiteness.

Prof. Gersen, of Harvard Law, repeatedly uses the phrase "Sparse Country," capitalized even (perhaps for emphasis?  Is there a whiff of disdain--or more than whiff--here?) to refer to the 20 states from which Harvard makes a particular effort to recruit students.  (I want to know what 20 states constitute "sparse country" but Gersen does not list them; elsewhere the New York Times listed a few of them, including Montana and Alabama).
In his testimony, William Fitzsimmons, the dean of admissions, who has worked in the admissions office since before Bakke, reminisced about his Harvard roommate in the nineteen-sixties, who was “a great ambassador” for South Dakota. He also testified about the letters Harvard sends to high-school students in Sparse Country who have P.S.A.T. scores of at least 1310, encouraging them to apply. The only Sparse Country students with such scores who do not get the letter are Asians; to receive it, an Asian male must score at least 1380. An attorney for the plaintiff asked why a white boy in, say, immigrant-rich Las Vegas with a score of 1310 would get the letter, while his Asian classmate with a 1370 would not. Fitzsimmons responded with generalities about the need to recruit from a broad array of states to achieve diversity.
The quotation marks around "great ambassador" suggest to me Gersen's derision of the rural experience and the notion that kids from rural places might have anything to teach urban kids, who are no doubt the Harvard student body default. 
When asked whether Harvard “put a thumb on the scale for white students” from Sparse Country, Fitzsimmons contrasted students who “have only lived in the Sparse Country state for a year or two” with those who “have lived there for their entire lives under very different settings.” Perhaps he meant that whites are more likely to be “farm boys” or “great ambassadors,” like his South Dakotan roommate. Or perhaps he meant that Asians are more likely than whites to apply to Harvard, less likely to be accepted, and more likely to enroll if accepted, so Harvard saves itself postage costs by reducing its recruiting of Asians. But the exchange highlighted a key question of the trial: whether the Harvard admissions process treats white racial identity as an asset, relative to Asian identity (or treats Asian identity as a drawback, relative to white identity).
This explanation of Harvard's desire to attract students from "Sparse Country" suggests another meaning of the phrase--that the sparseness refers to the dearth of applicants from these places, not necessarily to the low density of the population.

As for Prof. Gersen's conflation of whiteness with rurality, it is arguably supported by Fitzsimmons' distinction between students who have not been in Sparse Country for very long and those who have been there all their lives.  That is, immigrants are moving into "Sparse Country" (as I have written about here and my colleague Michele Statz has written about here), and I would hope that Harvard would not devalue those immigrants simply because they have not lived in rural America for very long.  Indeed, those immigrants are probably valued by Harvard because they represent racial and ethnic groups generally underrepresented at Harvard--regardless of whether they are admitted to Harvard from rural or urban places.

One issue that is not explicit in Prof. Gersen's musings is the distinction between "Sparse Country" as rural and "Sparse Country" as urban.  This gets at the issue of scale:  Is the scale of the "state" helpful if we want rural voices at Harvard and similarly situated institutions?   I have often argued (in conversation, though perhaps not explicitly in my publications) that admitting the children of doctors, lawyers, professors, engineers and such from Billings or Missoula or Bozeman Montana (or, Salt Lake City or Albuquerque or even Rapid City or Sioux City) is really nothing like admitting the real "farm boy"--or, more importantly, farm girl--from one of these states.  So if Harvard sees "Sparse Country" as 20 states, it's missing out on the complexity of the dramatic variations within those states.

The best seller Educated, a memoir by Tara Westover, helps to make my point.  Tara was raised by fundamentalist Latter Day Saint parents in southern Idaho--which is NOTHING like being raised by wealthy retirees in, say, Sun Valley, or even as the daughter of physicians in Boise.  Do we really want to look at issues like diversity of lived experience at the level of the state?  Or do we need to look to a lower scale to achieve more authentic diversity?  Doesn't the phenomenally successful Educated help us to see that distinction quite clearly?

Cross-Posted to Legal Ruralism.

Wednesday, October 24, 2018

A path forward in the war on drugs

The documentary Meth Storm follows an impoverished family of meth addicts in rural Arkansas who are struggling to manage their addiction and stay out of prison. The son, Teddy, has found religion during his sixth stint in prison in the past ten years, and he promises the mother of his children that he will get sober and get his life back on track. Teddy’s mother said this commitment to sobriety was unlikely to last. She says her son has merely found “jailhouse religion” and will be back on meth shortly after he gets out. Disappointingly, Teddy’s mother is right. A few months later Teddy is arrested again for possession and finds himself in prison for a seventh time.

On the other side of the drug war, DEA agent Johnny Sowell acknowledges that every time they arrest a drug dealer, a replacement springs up shortly thereafter. Still, he hopes that this latest round of arrests of low-level drug dealers, dubbed Operation Ice Storm, will lead to the source of the super-potent meth coming in from Mexico. Johnny busts as many low-level dealers as he can, for selling as little as a gram of meth. He pumps them for information until he finally catches a direct connection to the cartel in a dangerous high speed chase. The connection refuses to snitch. If he does, the connection’s entire family in Mexico will be killed. Another dead end in the drug war.

Teddy and Johnny have something in common besides their decaying town. They both keep doing the same things they have always done, in futile hope of a better result. Teddy keeps trying to turn his life around, but always goes back to drugs. Johnny keeps arresting people like Teddy to stop the flow of drugs, but he never gets any closer to the source. Like characters in a modern Greek tragedy, it is impossible for anybody in this community to avoid the cruelty of their own fate. The war on drugs rages on, regardless of the participants efforts to resist.

So what is to be done for communities ravaged by drugs like the one in Meth Storm and their urban counterparts? What is needed is compassion in the law for addicts and drug users, one that recognizes their humanity and decouples it from race or income level.

But what does this compassion look like in policy terms? To start, we must create avenues for drug users to course correct before they are trapped in the cycle of addiction and incarceration. For example, drug courts which emphasize treatment instead of just punishment have shown promising drops in rates of recidivism among drug users. Well maintained and funded pretrial diversion programs are also effective in preventing users from being rearrested.

We also need to reform how we treat drug users who find themselves incarcerated. A study from 2002 indicated that over half of all prisoners in the US met the criteria for a diagnosis of drug abuse or dependence, but only 15 to 20 percent of those who would benefit from treatment received it. Part of the reason is that the current criminal justice system focuses on punishment, rather than treating addiction as a disease. When prisons spend their resources in accordance with this assumption, the inevitable result is that many of the incarcerated do not get the help they need. Every addict who goes to prison should receive treatment for their addiction, otherwise it is only a matter of time before many will return.

Another reform that has been gaining traction is ending mandatory minimums that were a result of the tough-on-crime stances of the 1980s and 1990s. Although the end of the racially tinged 100:1 ratio in sentencing for crack cocaine versus cocaine was a welcome reform, this was a band-aid policy for a specific drug and not a permanent solution. The law still maintains a grossly unfair 18:1 sentencing ratio between crack cocaine and cocaine, and the vast majority of mandatory minimums have not been addressed. For example, the mandatory federal minimum sentence for distribution of five grams of methamphetamine is five years, even though that amount could be as little as a week’s supply to a heavy user.

In addition to ending mandatory minimums, we must go further to ensure that there is something worth returning home to after former dealers and users have served their sentences. We need to invest in job training for prisoners and provide opportunities for these returning individuals to work in their communities and become contributing members of society.

Another consideration is that sentences for using or selling even a small amount of drugs can last much longer than the period of incarceration or parole, because hiring managers discriminate against those with drug convictions. We must destigmatize non-violent drug convictions in hiring and allow rehabilitated drug offenders to have their slate wiped clean. Without these reforms, the reality is that in an area with no jobs like Faulkner County, Arkansas in Meth Storm, the only way the formerly incarcerated can make money is in the drug trade, which will further ingratiate themselves into the cycle of addition and incarceration.

So how do we obtain the political capital to get these policy outcomes in place? We need to humanize drug users and, yes, even low-level drug dealers. The first step is to encourage the positive trends of humanizing opioid users. For people of color whose communities have been criminalized for decades as a result of the war on drugs, it may be difficult for many to square the injustice of only granting compassion to wealthier and whiter opioid users. However, the reality is that many Americans continue to otherize drug users, by saying drug use is something that only poor whites, Latinos, or Black folks do.

In order to help build a broader coalition of support, we need the public to believe that addiction can affect their own family and friends, so any humanizing narratives about drug use and addiction are helpful. For example, when rockstar and drug addict Tom Petty died of an accidental overdose, there was an outpouring of support and much credit given to his family for making his cause of death public. However, when a poor addict like Teddy dies in rural Arkansas, its doubtful that there will be similarly affectionate support. It will just be another sad statistic in the war on drugs. With greater recognition that drug use is not attributable to someone’s characteristics of being poor or a racial minority, we can enact policies that will change the fates of people like Johnny and Teddy in Meth Storm.

Friday, October 19, 2018

Rural gets mention in lawsuit faulting Harvard's admission policies, but is it just a proxy for whiteness?

This story has been making big headlines all week, but today was the first day I noticed multiple mentions of rural students--specifically rurality as an aspect of the much sought-after diversity in higher education.  The headline in the NY Times today is "Harvard's Admissions Process, Once Secret, is Unveiled in Federal Court."   One of the secrets, apparently, is that being from a "rural" place still matters.  I say "still" because back when UC Regents v. Bakke was decided 40 years ago, Justice Powell wrote, citing Harvard's admission policy (as a model for what would be appropriate for public universities):
In practice, this new definition of diversity has meant that race has been a factor in some admission decisions. When the Committee on Admissions reviews the large middle group of applicants who are ‘admissible’ and deemed capable of doing good work in their courses, the race of an applicant may tip the balance in his favor just as geographic origin or a life spent on a farm may tip the balance in other candidates’ cases. A farm boy from Idaho can bring something to Harvard College that a Bostonian cannot offer. Similarly, a black student can usually bring something that a white person cannot offer.  (emphasis added)
Bakke, at 316-17.  While the word "rural" is not used here; "farm" is a proxy for that characteristic, that life experience.  Read more analysis of how rurality plays in college admissions more recently, from my 2015 law review article here.

This quote from today's NYTimes story recounts what happened at the trial in Boston this week:
There is the longtime dean of admissions, William Fitzsimmons (Harvard Class of 1967), on the stand, grilled on whether rural students receive a leg up over urban students. They do.
Something tells me that the observers are likely to invoke rurality as a proxy for whiteness, urbanicity for blackness, as happened with another controversy over the favoring of rural folks earlier this year, that one regarding SNAP work requirements.  That conflation of rurality with whiteness is unfortunate because, among other reasons, it misleads:  many of the poorest rural folks in the nation are Latinx, American Indian, and African American.  Just check out the nation's persistent poverty map.

Back to the NYTimes story, later comes this, following a comparison of Harvard's admissions standards to the secret formula for Coca-Cola:
Some, but not all, of the secrets have buttressed Harvard’s elite reputation. 
It casts a wide net for students, aggressively recruiting those in “sparse country,” predominantly rural areas that yield few applications. It considers a dizzying array of factors, from SAT scores (the higher the better) to athletic ability (recruited athletes receive a big advantage) to interviews (be “effervescent,” “fun,” but “mature”) and more. A lack of deep pockets won’t hinder a hopeful and might even help one’s chances, testimony showed.  (emphasis added)
I can't help wonder if geography--and rurality in particular--will be noted in the outcome of this present case--as it was in Bakke--even though rurality was not a characteristic that loomed large in the pleadings by either side.

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism.  

Tuesday, October 9, 2018

If the white working class won’t support Ocasio-Cortez because of a $3,000 suit, why did they elect Trump?

After winning an upset victory against Joe Crowley in the Democratic primary for New York’s 14th Congressional District, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez could make history as the youngest woman ever elected to Congress. So, of course it is only fitting that there is major controversy over her clothes. Yes, you read that correctly: her clothes.

For some background, Ocasio-Cortez is a self-proclaimed Democratic socialist with aspirations
to create an America that works for all of us—not just the wealthiest few,
according to her campaign page. Ocasio-Cortez runs on a platform that prioritizes the needs of working families and seeks to implement pro-working-class-policies such as Medicare-for-all, free public universities, and a guaranteed job program. The young politician frequently describes her own background as working-class—pointing to her Bronx upbringing, her mother’s occupation as a housekeeper, and her immigrant family’s economic troubles.

Ocasio-Cortez could be the working-class leader the Democratic Party needs to finally appeal to white-working-class ("WWC") voters, but an outfit choice has apparently aligned her with privileged elites instead. In a photo-op with Interview Mag last month accompanying a conversation with an editor, Ocasio-Cortez is shown wearing a sharp emerald blazer (Gabriela Hearst $1,990), matching trousers (Gabriela Hearst $890), and black pointed-toe heels (Monolo Blahnik $625). Photos of Ocasio-Cortez in the roughly $3,500 suit standing next to New York construction workers quickly prompted an uproar in the conservative web-space, many naming her a hypocrite.

These commenters appear from their profiles to be of the WWC demographic:
Is Ocasio-Cortez more of a limousine liberal than a socialist? . . . She’s wearing a more than a month’s salary for most Americans…and she’s going to lecture us about income inequality and why we should trust her and her ilk with our money. No—hell no. - Matt Vespa, Town hall
[S]ocialists looooove money. . . . Same goes for the hot new socialist, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. She's everywhere now as she runs for a New York seat in the U.S. House. And with that comes money — and bling. - Joseph Curl, Daily Wire
No, she's a real socialist. This is what socialism is. You tell the people that they deserve more, and those stinky 'rich' people aren't paying their fair share. Then you join the ranks of the elite, bu[y] expensive clothes, lake houses, Audis, etc., and you're set. This is socialism. This is literally what it is. America First, Reddit
Popular conservative activist Charlie Kirk questioned Ocasio-Cortez's allegiance to the working-class on Twitter:

Kirk's tweet received 16,105 retweets and 37,677 likes, and although he does not purport to speak for the WWC, many may find Kirk's argument compelling. Ocasio-Cortez's outfit choice was also critiqued on prime time television. In a segment on Fox News show Fox and Friends, hosts Katie Pavlich and Pete Hegseth mocked Ocasio-Cortez for her 'expensive tastes.'
Pavlich started by saying: The rising star of the Democratic Party has expensive tastes for a socialist. For a photo shoot for Interview Magazine. Her pant suit — appropriate — retailing more than $2,800 alone. And the shoes $600 bucks.

As the studio gasped in shock and awe, Hegseth chimed in: It's tough being a socialist. It really is.

Pavlich then added: I mean I want a pair of $600 shoes. I think she should redistribute…hypocrisy at its best.
As Ocasio-Cortez pointed out in her response to Kirk, however, the clothes weren’t even hers—as with all magazine shoots, the outfit was borrowed from the designer for publicity purposes. But viewers of Fox News—who are primarily white and many working-class, CNN reports—will probably stop the inquiry at was was aired on Fox and Friends and align her with privileged elites.

Ocsasio-Cortez—who almost lost her family home to foreclosure after her father’s death, went to college on student loans, and currently lives in the Bronx on a working class salary—should certainly be considered working-class. Like members of the WWC, Ocsasio-Cortez
grew up seeing how the zip code one is born in determines much of their opportunity.
She has more in common with the WWC than any wealthy Republican politician, but it seems that the commentators above will look for any minuscule reason to disregard Ocsasio-Cortez as a privileged liberal. By bringing attention to Ocasio-Cortez's expensive clothes (which, again, were borrowed), conservative media paints the self proclaimed working-class champion as someone who, instead, cannot possibly relate to the WWC.

Instead (and oddly enough), it seems that the WWC identifies more soundly with Republican figures like Donald Trump. Tom Cotton, U.S. Senator from Arkansas, claims that when the liberal media makes fun of Trump's hair, his orange glow, the way he talks, his long tie, and his taste for McDonalds, the WWC somehow sees this as insulting them.
What I don’t think they realize is that out here in Arkansas and the heartland and the places that made a difference in that election, like Michigan and Wisconsin, when we hear that kind of ridicule, we hear them making fun of the way we look, and the way we talk, and the way we think.
Apparently the WWC are quick to overlook Trump's taste for $17,000 Brioni suits and the fact that he has never been and never will be working-class (See Trump's $413 million inheritance from his father here). Although Trump may pretend to understand the struggles of the working-class, his policies have certainly done nothing to alleviate them.

Unfortunately, the divide between the Democratic party and the white-working-class is larger than ever. It is this animosity that pushes the WWC toward uber-wealthy real estate moguls and away from candidates, like Ocsasio-Cortez, who understand their plight.

For a discussion on the role of gender in the animosity between the WWC and Democratic party, see a related blog post here.

Friday, October 5, 2018

Do legal employers recruit class diversity?

When employers recruit for “diversity”, what are they looking for? Joan Williams, professor of law at U.C. Hastings, argues that class diversity should be one of the metrics employers pursue. You can read her September 2018 article in the Harvard Business Review here. As I read Williams’ article, I wondered to what extent employers already use class as a measure of beneficial diversity in hiring.

Because I’m a law student, I explored this by analyzing the diversity recruiting posts circulated at my school in the 2017-2018 school year. The law is not known as a particularly diverse profession, and it is becoming aware of the need to address that reputation. Big firms now often offer “diversity fellowships,” “diversity clerkships,” or “diversity scholarships.” These are paid internships at the firm, between the first and second years of law school, that are only available to “diverse” students. There are few other positions available in that first summer which are paid.

If these internships are only available to “diverse” students, how do the firms define diversity? I looked at 25 postings for internships of this type available to me in my first year of law school.

I found three approaches: the first approach was to list categories. This was the dominant mode. Of the 25 listings I analyzed, thirteen used this strategy and all thirteen explicitly mentioned racial or ethnic diversity. Nine discussed sexual orientation or being LGBTQ; seven included disability; seven listed socioeconomic status or economic disadvantage; four mentioned women or gender; two postings touched on religious diversity; two listed veteran status; and one included status as being the first in the family to attend college or purse an advanced degree. Of the seven that listed economic disadvantage, one firm considered that factor as a “boost” to the resume of an otherwise-diverse candidate, not a basis of diversity in and of itself. Finally, six postings included broad, “catch-all” language at the end of their enumerated lists, such as “…or others of diverse backgrounds.”

Is class, then, a category that recruiters seek? It depends on how “class” is defined. Education at the level of less than a college degree is perhaps the most common way to define the working class; by that metric, only one job posting is recruiting students from working-class backgrounds. If class is defined by income or socioeconomic disadvantage, however, class diversity is widely recruited. More than half of job posts listed socioeconomic disadvantage, making it one of the top four traits named. There is still, however, the question of perception: given that race is listed in every post, will white working-class students assume that “diversity” requires racial diversity as a prerequisite? Will they read far enough into the post to see the call for students of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and believe that they qualify on those grounds?

The second approach was to avoid defining diversity at all. Five posts used this tactic. These five used broad language like “underrepresented in the legal profession.” While this is an accurate description of the goals of diversity recruiting and is inclusive of a wide variety of experiences, it is extremely vague. It doesn’t help a job applicant know if they qualify for the position. Given the prevalence of the first approach, it seems likely that many law students will assume that these undefined listings intend to signal the same categories outlined above, of which race is dominant. Unless class migrants are aware that they qualify as “underrepresented in the legal profession,” believe that the employer will think so as well, and are able to articulate that with confidence, such broad language will not be effective in recruiting class migrants. This is especially true for white class migrants who will not qualify on racial or ethnic grounds.

In the final approach I saw in the job postings, diversity seemed not to reflect who the candidate is but rather what the candidate does. A few firms combined this approach with the enumerated categories described above, but many used this as a stand-alone tactic. A total of ten listings used some form of this tactic. These firms required the candidate to show a “commitment to diversity,” “efforts that promote diversity,” or even “involvement in diversity organizations.” One firm required that the candidate “[p]ossess an understanding of the importance of diversity and inclusion in the legal profession.”

This approach seems unhelpful. Surely the point of having separate “diversity recruitment” is not simply to get people who believe in or work for diversity; that could be accomplished in the normal recruiting process. Moreover, this approach seems likely to work against class migrants. The sorts of organizations that “promote diversity” are normally non-profits which cannot pay their volunteers. People from a working-class background are less likely to have had the option to work without pay and add such organizations to their resume. I also wonder whether there exist sufficient organizations promoting class diversity for such experience to be widespread on the resumes of class migrants.

Based on this limited and admittedly not randomized sample, it seems that Williams is only partially correct, at least as to legal employers. While law firm diversity recruitment does not seem to prioritize class migrants, the firms arguably put some effort towards increasing class diversity. Slightly less than a third of posts discussed socioeconomic disadvantage or listed a background of less education. Personally, however, I am not convinced that, in the context of all the other posts, this recruitment will be as effective in recruiting class migrants as it could be.

Saturday, September 8, 2018

On Trump and "dumb southerners"

A recent New York Times story reveals that Trump once used the term "dumb southerners" to refer to the Georgia-based relatives of his then-wife, Marla Maples.  Here's an excerpt from the story by Peter Baker and Maggie Haberman, "'I Don't Talk that Way,' Trump Says.  Except When He Does," quoting Jeane MacIntosh, former deputy editor of the New York Post gossip column, "Page 6": 
Ms. MacIntosh had called Mr. Trump one day in May 1997 to ask him about a tip she had received that his second wife, Marla Maples, had purchased two gold Lexus cars and that he had made her return them. 
“He said, ‘I have something better for you,’” Ms. MacIntosh recalled in an interview on Wednesday. If she dropped that story, he said, he would give her bigger news — that he planned to divorce Ms. Maples. When Ms. MacIntosh pressed him on why, he “essentially blamed her family,” she said, referring to Ms. Maples’s Georgia-based relatives. 
“Are you old enough to remember the show ‘The Beverly Hillbillies?’” he asked Ms. MacIntosh. 
She replied yes, and Mr. Trump laughed and said, “That’s exactly her family, except they came to New York City instead of Beverly Hills.” Ms. MacIntosh added, “I said, ‘What do you mean?’ And he said she was constantly surrounded ‘by an entourage of dumb Southerners.’” He even adopted a fake southern accent to mimic Ms. Maples’s mother, Ms. MacIntosh said.
Northerners ridiculing Southerners is, of course, old news.  I've written about it most recently here.  But coming from President Trump, these words and attitudes become political news because he has relied so heavily on southern white voters to put him in power. 

The incident reminds me of a time early in my teaching career when a student who had grown up in greater New York City approached me about five weeks into the semester and said something like this, "You know, Professor Pruitt, we didn't think you were very smart at the beginning of the semester, because of your accent and such.  But you really have quite a vocabulary, and we've changed our assessment of you."  Gee, thanks!  At least that student had remained open to changing her assessment over the course of those early weeks.