Showing posts with label education. Show all posts
Showing posts with label education. Show all posts

Thursday, March 14, 2024

Recent coverage of (white) working class voters in the run up to 2024

Here's a Feb. 21, 2024 New York Times column by Thomas Edsall titled, "Does Biden have to Cede the White Working Class to Trump?"  Here's an excerpt:

“For Victory in 2024, Democrats Must Win Back the Working Class,” Will Marshall, the founder and president of the Progressive Policy Institute, wrote in October 2023. “Can Democrats Win Back the Working Class?” Jared Abbott and Fred DeVeaux of the Center for Working-Class Politics asked in June 2023; “Democrats Need Biden to Appeal to Working-Class Voters” is how David Byler, the former Washington Post data columnist, put it the same month.

However persuasive they are, these arguments raise a series of questions.

First, is the Democratic attempt to recapture white working-class voters a fool’s errand? Is this constituency irrevocably committed to the Republican Party — deaf to the appeal of a Democratic Party it sees as committed to racial and cultural liberalism?
Edsall includes this interesting quote from Yale's Jacob Hacker and colleagues:
even as Democrats have increasingly relied on affluent, educated voters, the party has embraced a more ambitious economic agenda. The national party has bridged the blue divide not by forswearing redistribution or foregrounding cultural liberalism but by formulating an increasingly bold economic program — albeit one that elides important inequalities within its metro-based multiracial coalition.

I wouldn't mind some clarification of what they mean by "elides important inequalities within its metro-based multiracial coalition."   Does that mean socioeconomic and racial inequalities are elided in metro areas?  And if so, what does that mean for nonmetro residents?  

Edsall doesn't answer that question but does move on to this: 

With Democrats’ strongest base concentrated in cities, the need to remain competitive, Hacker and his co-authors wrote,

has made the Democrats’ growing reliance on prosperous metro areas (i.e., suburbs) both necessary and consequential. The party’s base has long been in cities, but the party has dramatically expanded its reach into less dense suburban areas that are economically integrated with major urban centers.

Interesting, but still no mention of nonmetro areas.  

Frances Lee of Princeton suggested that the strategy described by Hacker could prove problematic: 

To the extent that the nation’s political discourse is driven by highly educated people, there is danger that opinion leaders are falling increasingly out of touch with the rest of the population.

William Galston of Brookings also commented negatively on Hacker's vision of the Democratic Party strategy (in a way that sorta' implies the strategy does omit rural folks, and highlights the growing cross-racial coalition among working-class folks--a coalition moving toward Trump and Republicans): 

The lines between the white working class and the nonwhite working class are eroding. Donald Trump received 41 percent of the non-college Hispanic vote in 2020 and may well do better this time around. If this turns out to be the case, then the old Democratic formula — add minorities to college-educated voters to make a majority — becomes obsolete.

Then comes Edsall's column one week later, titled "The Red-Blue Divide Goes Well Beyond Biden and Trump."  Here's the lede: 

One of the major reasons white non-college voters turned to Donald Trump in 2016 and 2020 is the fear of lost white hegemony — that the United States will become a majority-minority nation sometime in the near future.

All I can say is that I would love to see one empirical source cited for this proposition.  Surely there are several, but I'd like to see just one for this bold and very damning proposition.   

Here's another piece, this one from The Liberal Patriot, on the non-white working class "bailing out on the Democrats."  Speaking of Obama's 2012 Presidential victory, Ruy Teixeira writes:  

Obama carried nonwhite working-class (noncollege) voters by a massive 67 points, while losing white college graduates by 7 points. That means Obama did 74 points betteramong the nonwhite working class than among white college graduates.

In the next two presidential elections, that differential steadily narrowed as Democrats did worse among nonwhite working-class voters even as they improved among white college graduates. In 2020, Biden carried the nonwhite working class by 48 points (19 points less than Obama did in 2012) while carrying white college graduates by 9 points (16 points better than Obama). That cut the Democrats’ positive differential between these two groups almost in half, down to 39 points.

Now it’s Biden running for a second term and, astonishingly, that positive differential may have entirely disappeared.

Tuesday, June 13, 2023

Center for Working Class Politics on the most successful Democratic Party candidates

David Leonhardt writes in today's New York Times newsletter under the headline, "How Democrats can Win Workers" and the subhead, "Teachers, Not Lawyers."  Here's an excerpt:  

About 60 percent of U.S. voters do not have a four-year college degree, and they live disproportionately in swing states. As a result, these voters — often described as the American working class — are crucial to winning elections. Yet many of them are deeply skeptical of today’s Democratic Party.

Republicans retook control of the House last year by winning most districts with below-median incomes. In nearly 20 Western and Southern states, Democrats are virtually shut out of statewide offices largely because of their weakness among the white working class. Since 2018, the party has also lost ground with Black, Asian and especially Latino voters.

Unless the party improves its standing with blue-collar voters, “there’s no way for progressive Democrats to advance their agenda in the Senate,” according to a study that the Center for Working-Class Politics, a left-leaning research group, released this morning.

The class inversion of American politics — with most professionals supporting Democrats and more working-class people backing Republicans — is one of the most consequential developments in American life (and, as regular readers know, a continuing theme of this newsletter).

Today, I’ll be writing about what Democrats might do about the problem, focusing on a new YouGov poll, conducted as part of the Center for Working-Class Politics study. In an upcoming newsletter, I’ll examine the issue from a conservative perspective and specifically how Republicans might alter their economic agenda to better serve their new working-class base.

A key point is that even modest shifts in the working-class vote can decide elections. If President Biden wins 50 percent of the non-college vote next year, he will almost certainly be re-elected. If he wins only 45 percent, he will probably lose.

Saturday, December 17, 2022

On a working-class Democrat who won in one of the mid-term's biggest surprises

I've written a lot about Marie Glausenkamp Perez over at Legal Ruralism, like here and here.  She's the 34-year-old who beat a Trump-y Republican in Washington's 3d congressional district this fall.  She and her husband own an auto repair shop.  A few days ago, The Nation ran an interview Nick Bowlin conducted with her, and some of the quotes regarding class screamed out for attention here on the working-class whites blog:  
NB: It’s my understanding that the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee [the party’s arm for House races] didn’t spend on your behalf, is that right? How did you pull off the win with minimal party support?

MGP: The DCCC never put in any money. Near the very end, I believe the House Majority PAC did come in [The House Democratic caucus’s main Super PAC spent $300,000 on her behalf in the final week]. I listen to my friends at home. I found allies. I found neighbors. I built a coalition. And I really got to stay focused on what matters to my district.

It was very frustrating to never be taken seriously by many in the party establishment. But it’s also not surprising, because people like me who work in the trades are used to being treated like we’re dumb.
NB: Do you think that perception explains why it took so long for them to even consider you as a viable candidate?

MGP: Yes, I do. I don’t think they think that, but when I went to a meeting with the DCCC after I won, I asked, “How many of your candidates don’t have graduate degrees? How many didn’t go to college? How many work in the trades?” And they said, “I don’t know.” Well, maybe you should know. Maybe that should be important to you, because it’s important to many, many Americans.

They really need to reassess what they think makes a qualified candidate. I’m not special. There are a lot of people like me, who really can serve our districts who understand them deeply. We have got to do a better job of recruiting those folks to run if we want to be relevant in rural places.

NB: I’m glad you brought up health care monopolies in rural areas. When we talk about corporate consolidation and power in the US, these conversations can leave out the specific ways these issues impact rural economies. On the campaign trail, you talked a lot about right-to-repair and other monopoly issues. Can you say more about this?

MGP: Right-to-repair is honestly one of the biggest reasons that I ran for Congress. Democrats love to talk about how they support the trades or being pro-labor. I think this is this is a crisis for the middle class, and it’s a crisis for the trades. Supporting the trades means ensuring that there are things to fix. That’s also part of being an environmentalist, ensuring that we have things to fix, that things are made to last and we don’t dispose of them. And it’s about cars and tractors, but also electronic waste. This is about home medical equipment. It’s this creeping, metastasizing problem, and it’s taking away a fundamentally American part of our identity. DIY is in our DNA. And I really believe that we’re being turned into a permanent class of renters who don’t really own their stuff.

Interestingly, there is no mention in this article of the fact that Gluesenkamp Perez has a degree from uber-lefty Reed College in Portland.   

Saturday, July 9, 2022

Profspring: Folks with well-educated parents dominate academia

Andrew Van Dam writes for the Washington Post under the headline, "People from elite backgrounds increasingly dominate academia, data shows." The subhead is "First-generation academics were always rare. Now they're vanishing."
To understand critical issues facing the U.S. economy — soaring inflation, worker shortages and perhaps a looming recession — researchers must understand human behavior. They need to know how everyday Americans will react when pump prices double or shelves go bare.

That’s why it’s somewhat alarming to learn that academia in general — and economics in particular — has quietly become the province of an insular elite, a group likely to have had little exposure to the travails of America’s vast middle class.

In 1970, just 1 in 5 U.S.-born PhD graduates in economics had a parent with a graduate degree. Now? Two-thirds of them do, according to a new analysis from the Peterson Institute for International Economics. The trends are similar for other fields (and for foreign-born students), but economics is off the charts. 
The new analysis comes from Anna Stansbury of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and University of Michigan graduate student Robert Schultz, who got their hands on detailed data on U.S. PhD recipients going back more than 50 years.

* * * 

To an outsider, the long path to a professorship can seem frustratingly opaque, particularly in economics. PhD programs tend to require a hidden curriculum of classes in subjects such as mathematics that are not technically required for economics majors. If you discover economics late in your college career and don’t have expert guidance, it might already be too late to get on the PhD track. Similar hidden hurdles lurk in the job market and academic publishing.

* * *

Stansbury said she also wonders if courses like Econ 101 might put off students from low-income backgrounds. “I also worry that some of the terminology that’s used, like ‘unskilled’ or ‘low ability’ to describe people who are in low-paid jobs or with little formal education, is offensive,” Stansbury said. “And I can see that this would be disproportionately so to people who are coming from backgrounds where these words are describing family members and friends.”

This study is one of the first to describe academia’s struggles with economic diversity, but its racial diversity issues have been well documented.

Saturday, May 7, 2022

A literary depiction of the geography of the class culture wars: Groundskeeping by Lee Cole

I've been listening to Groundskeeping, by Lee Cole, which the New York Times reviewed in March.  I was intrigued by the socioeconomic class aspect of the review, set in that fateful election year 2016.  Here's what Hamilton Cain wrote in that NYT review, referring to Cole, the author, and Owen, the novel's protagonist:  

If economic class is the third rail of American life, then [author] Cole eases his hand out, gently, to touch it, his realism a meld of Richard Russo and Anne Tyler by way of Sally Rooney. Despite [protagonist] Owen’s modest upbringing, he’s a striver with scant chill. He’s liberal in his politics and passionate about Walt Whitman and Modigliani, stoking a sense of curiosity and discipline not always associated with his demographic.

And here's a quote from the novel, excerpted in Cain's review, that illustrates the role of place and culture in it.

“I explained that Cracker Barrel was cheap, and they were working-class people without a lot of money who nonetheless wanted the experience of a family outing,” Owen notes. “They loved the food and the décor not because they had bad taste, but because it was familiar to them. They’d grown up on actual farms, milking cows and pulling the suckers from actual tobacco. They’d eaten stewed apples and turnip greens and ham hock, and the tools on the walls had been the tools their fathers used, in a time that was not, at least in Kentucky, some distant yesteryear. It was recent and vivid, and the ache of its passing away therefore still present, like a phantom limb.” 

Cain's review tells us that the protagonist grew up in "a dot of a town" in western Kentucky.  In fact, there is not a lot of rural in this book--unless one believes, as I tend to do, that rural culture moves to town when rural folks move to the city.  This novel seems to support that thesis.  Or maybe it's more accurate to say this novel illustrates why "rural" is often conflated with "working-class white" in contemporary political discussions.  

The rural culture associated with the flyover states is alive and well, it seems, in places like Louisville, where the novel is set.  That's evident in this conversation between the two primary characters.  One is  Owen, who aspires to be a writer but for now is working as a groundskeeper at a posh Louisville university; that job permits him to enroll free of charge in a class, and he's studying creative writing.  The other is Alma, a professional writer who is writer in residence at the university, an immigrant from Bosnia.  You see here how her parents' attitudes toward education differed dramatically from that of the parents of Owen.     

You'll be able to tell who is who in this dialogue, which occurs at a juncture where they are becoming romantically interested in each other:    

As we walked on, she pulled the sleeves of her sweatshirt over her fists and crossed her arms, shivering a little. Did you go to Princeton? I said.

Yep.

How was that?

She thought about the question a few moments. It was wonderful in a lot of ways, and also evil in a lot of ways. Going there as an immigrant is different than going as a legacy from some old-money family.

Was that where you always wanted to go?

I got into Dartmouth and Penn, too. I might’ve gone to Harvard, but they wait-listed me.

I didn’t ask where you got in, I asked where you wanted to go.

It’s hard to differentiate what you want from what your parents want at that age, you know?

I nodded as if I understood what she meant from experience, but I had no idea. When I was eighteen, all of my energy had been spent maintaining a clear border between what I wanted and what my parents wanted, defending its sovereignty against constant incursion.

No state schools?

She laughed.

Yeah, right.

So it was Ivy League or nothing?

Not even, she said. Cornell is a joke. Stanford would’ve been all right. I would’ve been okay with Stanford.

I can’t tell if you’re being serious.

Why would I not be serious?

There was a finality to her response that made it seem like she’d rather talk about something else.

I always wanted to go to a highfalutin school, I said.

She smiled skeptically. Now you’re just playing it up. You don’t really say “highfalutin.”

I just did, didn’t I?

So what happened, why didn’t you go to a highfalutin school?

I explained to her that I’d wanted to go to a good school when I was young, but by the time I finished high school, my grades weren’t good enough, and anyhow, my parents wouldn’t have been able to afford the out-of-state tuition. I ended up at the University of Kentucky, barely managing to graduate with a degree in English.

Didn’t anyone tell you that you were capable of more?

My parents didn’t want me to go off and become a coastal elite. If they’d had their druthers, I’d have gone to Murray State, an hour from their house.

Their druthers?

Yeah, you’ve never heard that? No, she said, laughing. That’s definitely going on the list. 
When do I get to see this list? 
When the time is right, she said. So what’s wrong with being a coastal elite? 
Nothing, as far as I’m concerned. To them, it’s the worst thing you could be. I’ve wanted to be a coastal elite my whole life.

She looked at me as if she both pitied me and found me adorable—a look I was getting used to.

(pp. 87-89) Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group. Kindle Edition (emphasis mine)

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism.  

Friday, April 10, 2020

The working class and coronavirus (Part I): Higher education

Uneven access to higher education has been a persistent theme in media coverage since colleges and universities began to close down a month ago and, in so doing, sending their students "home," whatever that means.  This phenomenon is closely related to a long-time theme of my research and a personal obsession:  access to higher education and what keeps low-income students from achieving it.  And let me be clear at the outset:  while this blog generally focuses on working-class whites, this post is about the wider working class.   

There is so much to say on this topic, so I'm primarily going to collect sources, beginning with some early stories about what was happening with the elite higher education sector.  The first story that crossed my radar screen was this one by the Harvard Crimson published on March 11, 2020.  An excerpt follows:
Dean of the College Rakesh Khurana wrote to Barton and more than 6,000 other undergraduates on Tuesday morning that campus would not reopen after spring break, which stretches from March 14 to 22. 
Within hours, the email sent students scrambling to pack up all their belongings and make plans to vacate. But Barton and others say it hit one group of undergraduates particularly hard: first-generation and low-income students, many of whom depend upon Harvard for food, housing, and stability. 
“They've been evicted from their stability, they've been evicted from their homes, they’ve been evicted from their ability to live comfortably and safely,” Barton, who is an FGLI [First Generation Low Income] student, said. “There's already enough concern, and now they're concerned about being able to get home and have stable housing and food.” 
Some students must ship or store their on-campus belongings without financial support from Harvard. Others who planned to stay on campus must now book unexpected flights home and accrue additional costs. And those who rely on term-time employment must confront additional financial concerns as they lose their primary sources of income. 
Nicholas T. “Nick” Wyville ’20 called the College’s announcement “outrageous,” adding that he believes it will weigh most heavily on him and his fellow FGLI students. 
“Harvard prides itself on having a massive student body that is a large percentage on financial aid,” Wyville said. “I think that they forget that those are the same students who often come from home situations that are uncomfortable.” 
This Harvard Crimson story is rare in that it does mention rural folks and their relative lack of access to technology, especially broadband: 
Wyville — who hails from Anniston, Ala. — said online courses are not feasible for him and some of his peers from rural or low-income areas, where many homes do not have internet access. 
“It's not as if we can just like up and go to the library or the coffee shop every day,” he said.
Even before that Crimson story came this, on March 9,  from the Washington Post.  The headline was "Amherst College switches to online learning, as universities nationally scramble to respond to covid-19 outbreak."  Susan Svrluga and Nick Anderson report:
The announcement was a dramatic stroke from a small but nationally renowned school: A growing number of colleges and universities have announced temporary shifts to virtual classes in recent days in response to the uncertainty and rapid pace of changes with the covid-19 outbreak. Amherst took especially decisive action.
They quote Amherst president Biddy Martin:
We know that many people will travel widely during spring break, no matter how hard we try to discourage it.  The risk of having hundreds of people return from their travels to the campus is too great. The best time to act in ways that slow the spread of the virus is now. Let me make our decisions clear.
* * * 
It will be hard to give up, even temporarily, the close colloquy and individual attention that defines Amherst College.  ... Our goal is to keep members of our community as safe as we possibly can while ensuring that students can complete their coursework for the semester and the daily operations of the institution can continue.
The story reports on many other posh campuses, including Vanderbilt, Princeton, NYU, Columbia, Stanford shutting down early that week, well ahead of many other prestigious institutions and also some that are less so (e.g., University of Washington).

Next I saw this piece in the Washington Post on March 11 which, like the Crimson piece, made the point that these shut downs are a hardship on poor students who don't have much of a place to go--especially if scholarships are paying for their room and board. The piece is actually an op-ed by two Amherst students, and here's a salient quote:
These residential colleges are also undermining much of their own rationale for existing. They are meant to be havens for young people, home-like places with established routines and networks meant to foster learning. They are also sanctuaries for low-income and marginalized students who might not have stable homes to return to on short notice. Students without computers or broadband will be unable to access online courses once they begin. Perhaps worst of all, some international Amherst students may be unable to return to campus, when it eventually reopens, because of the Trump administration’s recently expanded travel ban.

To its credit, Amherst’s administration has set up a petition process for students to ask to stay on campus, and the student government is trying to reimburse some fees to help pay for travel. But the default is eviction. Communications from the school this week indicate that refunding the cost of room and board — but not tuition — is being considered.
Many similar stories have run in the last few weeks.  Here's one about the particular disappointment for first generation college graduates who won't get to have their live commencement ceremonies:
Administrators and college presidents are scrambling to figure out what to do about graduation this year. How can they acknowledge students' hard work and success, while still maintaining social distancing amid the outbreak of coronavirus? 
Many colleges across the country have outright cancelled graduations, others, such as Harvard and Miami University in Ohio, have scheduled virtual ceremonies. Some students have taken things into their own hands and created their own ceremonies — on a reconstructed campus — through Minecraft.
* * *
Celebrating graduation wasn't really about her, says Monica Ferrufino, who's finishing up at California State University, Los Angeles. It was really going to be for her parents. 
"When they cancelled graduation, it was exactly 60 days prior to our scheduled commencement," she explains. She knows that because her mother and father kept track, counting down the days, crossing each one off on their calendar. When she told them it was off, her mom cried. "My parents didn't get to finish high school," she says, "so for them, seeing their daughter graduating college was just beyond their dreams."
And finally, here's one from the New York Times early this week suggesting that college was the great "leveler" or "equalizer" before coronavirus.  Let me begin by challenging that starting proposition, which seems absurd in light of my own research into higher education access and books like Suzanne Mettler's.  Here's an excerpt from her 2014 editorial, "College, the Great Unleveler."
Something else began to happen around 1980. College graduation rates kept soaring for the affluent, but for those in the bottom half, a four-year degree is scarcely more attainable today than it was in the 1970s. And because some colleges actually hinder social mobility, what increasingly matters is not just whether you go to college but where. 
The demise of opportunity through higher education is, fundamentally, a political failure. Our landmark higher education policies have ceased to function effectively, and lawmakers — consumed by partisan polarization and plutocracy — have neglected to maintain and update them.
Ah, so elitism in the higher education sector is an extremely important part of the big story here.  And that reminds me of this important NYT story from nearly a decade ago.

But/and let's return to the New York Times story suggesting the contrary, that college is a great leveler.  Here's an excerpt, which is just a teaser to get you to read the rest of Nicholas Casey's story, which speaks to extreme socioeconomic (dis) advantage, race/ethnicity, (dis)ability and a range of other issues salient to an authentic intersectionality:
The political science class was called “Forced Migration and Refugees.” Students read accounts of migrants fleeing broken economies and seeking better futures, of life plans drastically altered and the political forces that made it all seem necessary. 
Then suddenly, the subject matter became personal: Haverford College shut down and evicted most students from the dormitories as the coronavirus spread through Pennsylvania. 
Like many college courses around the country, the class soldiered on. The syllabus was revised. The students reconvened on a videoconferencing app. 
But as each logged in, not everyone’s new reality looked the same. 
One student sat at a vacation home on the coast of Maine. Another struggled to keep her mother’s Puerto Rican food truck running while meat vanished from Florida grocery shelves. As one young woman’s father, a private equity executive, urged the family to decamp to a country where infections were falling, another student’s mother in Russia couldn’t afford the plane ticket to bring her daughter home.
Bottom line:  much as so many in the United States resist this reality, class matters profoundly with respect to higher education access, as with respect to everything else.  And it's consequences are enduring, far beyond the Zoom-enabled classroom.

Oh, and something I learned from Nicholas Casey's story is about the existence of Questbridge, which helps low-income students connect with elite colleges.  Don't think that service was around back in the day I was making college application decisions.

Here's a story from April 6 in the Washington Post about student attitudes toward the widespread move to pass-fail grading. 

Postscript from Politico on April 12, 2020:  "'We're on the edge of the precipice': How the pandemic could shatter college dreams," by Bianca Quilantan.

Postscript from the Daily Yonder on April 13, 2020.

Postscript from Anemona Hartocollis of the New York Times on April 15, 2020, "After Coronavirus, Colleges Worry:  Will Students Come Back?"

And from the Los Angles Times on April 16, 2020, a story about coronavirus's $558 million impact on the University of California system.

Postscript from the The Atlantic on April 24, 2020, "What if Colleges Don't Re-Open until 2021?," by Adam Harris.

Postscript from Christina Paxson, President of Brown University, "College Campuses Must Re-open in the Fall.  Here's How We Do It," a guest editorial in the New York Times.

Postscript from The New Yorker on April 28, 2020, "How the Coronavirus Pandemic Has Shattered the Myth of College in America," by Masha Gessen.

More to follow in this series on socioeconomic class and coronavirus.

Wednesday, June 5, 2019

Rural California wins one (a rarity) in special election

Calfiornia's most rural politician has just defeated an urban (or, at best, suburban) politician for State Senate District 1.  The winner is not college educated.  The loser has a Bachelors degree from Harvard and a J.D. from Yale Law School.  Brian Dahle, the winner, has been mentioned in five prior blog posts here, one of them mentioning the occasion of his visit to my Law and Rural Livelihoods class several years ago.  Dahle garnered 53.4 % of the vote, and  his Ivy-educated opponent just 46.6%  One striking fact is that Dahle carried every nonmtro county by a considerable margin, while Kiley carried every metropolitian county--except Shasta County, the least metro of the metros, in the would-be State of Jefferson, which I'll discuss below.

As I have written elsewhere, it's hard to gain traction on rural issues in California because only about 2% of the state's population live in rural places, at least as "rural" is defined (admittedly, narrowly) by the U.S. Census Bureau (population clusters of less than 2,500 or open territory).  That trend was defied a few days ago when Brian Dahle of Lassen County (population 34,895, population density 7.39/square mile) defeated Kevin Kiley of Placer County (population 348,432, population density 230/square mile) to become California's newest State Senator.  Just as telling in terms of where these candidates come from spatially and culturally, Dahle is a seed farmer from Bieber, California, population 312.  (While Bieber is in Lassen County, it is on State Hwy 299, in the corner that connects Shasta County to very sparsely populated Modoc County, which may say something about the Shasta County vote; see below).  Kiley lives in the Placer County suburb of Rocklin.

District 1 includes all or part of 11 California counties and stretches from north Lake Tahoe to the Oregon state line.  Among the counties included in the district are all or parts of four metropolitan counties, including Sacramento County (1.4 million), Placer County (population 348.432), El Dorado County (population 181,058), and (much farther north), Shasta County, (population 177,223).

The California Secretary of State's page about this special election is here.  The Sacramento Bee's minimal coverage of the election is here.  The Redding Record Searchlight's coverage is here.  The Lassen County Times is here, though I was unable to click through to a story about the election, which might have been interesting since Dahle served on the Lassen County Board of Supervisors for 16 years before he was elected to the California General Assembly.

Here are the (approximate) votes (and population counts) for the Senate District's nonmetropolitan counties:

Lassen County, population 34,895: Dahle got 81.5% of the 4,000 votes.
Alpine County, population 1,175:  Dahle got 73.5% of the 223 votes.
Sierra County, population 3,240: Dahle got 67.2% of the 860 votes.
Plumas County, population 20,007: Dahle got 65.7% of the 4,400 votes.
Modoc County, population 9,686:  Dahle got 87.1% of the 1,857 votes.
Siskiyou County, population 44,900: Dahle got 69.7% of the 7,331 votes.
Nevada County, population 98,764:  Dahle got 67.1% of the 15,000 votes.

And here are the votes for the metropolitan counties--well, parts of some of those counties:

Sacramento County (partial 10.2%):  Kiley got 71.8% of about 21,000 votes.
Placer County (partial, 62.9%): Kiley got 60.8% of 38,000 votes
El Dorado County (all):  Kiley got 56% of about 31,000 votes.
Shasta County (all):  Dahle got 82.2% of about 28,000 votes.

The prior State Senator for this district was Ted Gaines, who lives in El Dorado Hills, a posh suburb/exurb of Sacramento, just over the Sacramento/El Dorado County line.  Thus, the election of Dahle, the seed farmer with a high school education, is quite a shift culturally and experientially.

In the run up to this run off, some controversies about the Senate District 1 election were reported in the Bee here and here.  Regarding the former, I can't help wonder if the lack of anonymity associated with rural people and places played a role in its possible efficacy (leaving aside, for now, the very dodgy ethics) of the mailer threatening to disclose folks' voting records.  The latter story describes how two Republicans (Dahle and Kiley) were the top two vote getters in the primary, while the Democrat, a woman from the Truckee/Lake Tahoe area, came in third.

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism. 

Saturday, February 2, 2019

On escapes, literary and otherwise, from Trump country

Don't miss Timothy Egan's op-ed piece in the New York Times today, in which he brings together Hillbilly Elegy (by J.D. Vance) and Educated (by Tara Westover) as documenting how to escape from "Trump country"--namely by access to education.  The piece is titled, "A Hillbilly and a Survivalist Show the Way out of Trump Country."  Here's a short excerpt:
The two great literary bookends of President Trump’s half-term of grift and chaos have come from survivors of the most broken white communities that helped put him in office. They also show us the best way out of the basement of American despair. 
How J.D. Vance, the author of “Hillbilly Elegy,” and Tara Westover, who wrote “Educated,” escaped physical and psychological horror is the dose of Charles Dickens that makes these two memoirs so memorable.
I admit I liked Westover's Educated better than Vance's Hillbilly Elegy, though each resonated with me in powerful ways.  As for the latter, I have written a published response, which is included in a collection of essays just out from West Virginia University Press, Appalachian Reckoning:  A Region Responds to Hillbilly Elegy.  The book is available for pre-order now and has received starred reviews from both Kirkus and Forward Reviews, which called it "[s]tunning in its intellectual and creative riches." Publishers's Weekly also gave it a very positive review.  My chapter is called "What Hillbilly Elegy Reveals about Race in 21st Century America." 

I'll be on a panel discussing the book in March at the Appalachian Studies Association meeting in Asheville, North Carolina.  Below is a screenshot of a Tweet by one of the volume's editors, Meredith McCarroll.  I think we're all still in shock that Ron Howard has paid $45 million for one man's very skewed and partial insights into his upbringing.   


Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism. 

Saturday, December 15, 2018

A focus on working class youth displaced by the Camp Fire

A great deal of coverage of the Camp Fire has focused on the elderly and those with disabilities, who made up a disproportionate percent of the residents of Paradis, California, and a disproportionate percentage of those killed in the fire.  Now, Dan Levin reports today in the New York Times under the headline, "After Wildfire, Class of 2019 Faces Uncertain Future."  As a student in this class and I suggested in posts a few weeks ago on Working Class Whites and the Law (here and here), Paradise, the small city destroyed in the so-called Camp Fire last month, was very much a working class town, and its population was predominantly white.  Here's a data point from Levin's story that reinforces the point:
  • 67 percent of Paradise High School students qualify for free or reduced lunch
The story features many profiles of Paradise High students.  One profile in particular reminds me of my Legal Ruralism post from a few days ago regarding the struggles of rural students in the higher education context:   
[Elie] Wyllie, 17, grew up in Paradise “way below the poverty line,” she said. Problems at home motivated her to get stellar grades. Her zeal for perfection made her Paradise High’s top tennis player and earned her the nickname The Comeback. She dreamed of becoming a cardiothoracic surgeon, believing that college was the sole path to changing her family’s fortunes.

She was in the midst of applying to a dozen colleges, including Yale, when the inferno reduced her home to ashes. While California state schools extended their application deadlines, she still does not have all the paperwork they require.
Levin quotes Wyllie:
Everything is crashing down.  Now I’ll be the only person in my family to have a future. They’re going to expect me to take care of them when I can barely take care of myself. 
Wyllie has moved in with her now-retired AP history teacher, the only way she could complete homework and her college applications.

Here's another sobering quote from Ms. Wyllie:
The Camp Fire tore up more than just my town; it took away my peace of mind.  Everything for the rest of my life is going to be affected by this.
Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism.  

Thursday, December 13, 2018

New developments in low-income (and rural) students' access to higher education

Access to higher education is one of my pet causes--in part because I am aware of the huge difference that it has made in my own life.  I'm really grateful that several students have blogged about the issue this semester, and I want to highlight in this post some excerpts from recent coverage of the issue.

First, Susan Dynarski (University of Michigan economist and one of my Twitter heroes) and colleagues have just released the results of their study of an inexpensive intervention aimed at getting low-income students to apply to the prestigious, flagship University of Michigan:  In short, they invite the low-income, high achievers to apply and let them know that, if admitted, tuition, room and board, and living expenses will be covered.  Here's part of the abstract of their paper:
We contact students (as well as their parents and principals) with an encouragement to apply and a promise of four years of free tuition and fees upon admission. Materials emphasize that this offer is not contingent on completing aid applications (e.g., the FAFSA or PROFILE). Treated students were more than twice as likely to apply to (67 percent vs. 26 percent) and enroll at (27 percent vs. 12 percent) the University of Michigan. There was no diversion from schools as (or more) selective as UM. The enrollment effect of 15 percentage points (pp) comprises students who would otherwise attend a less selective, four-year college (7 pp), a community college (4 pp), or no college (4 pp). Effects persist through two years of follow-up. The intervention closed by half the income gaps in college choice among Michigan's high-achieving students.
This came to my attention because David Leonhardt of the New York Times, long attuned to college access issues for low-income students, made it the subject of his daily newsletter yesterday.  His description of the findings is slightly more accessible to the layperson.  First, he provides this background:
Unfortunately, most working-class and poor teenagers, including many who excel in high school, still don’t graduate from college. They often enroll in colleges that have a high dropout rate and never finish.
Then he describes the study's findings in context:
In truth, the packet wasn’t promising anything new to most students. Those receiving it typically had good enough grades and test scores to be admitted to Michigan, as well as a family income low enough to qualify them for a full scholarship. 
And yet the experiment nonetheless had a huge effect. 
Some 67 percent of students who received the packets applied to Michigan, compared with 26 percent of a control group of similar students who did not. And 28 percent of recipients ended up enrolling in a top university (most of them at Michigan), compared with only 13 percent of the control group. Many members of the control group didn’t attend any college, despite being excellent high-school students.
A somewhat similar study from a few years ago is noted here.  It suggests that who gets recruited to attend an elite college has a lot to do with where one lives and goes to high schools.  Some high schools attract recruiters from elite colleges; most don't.  (Spoiler alert:  I don't know of any really rural high schools that do).

With this big news out of the University of Michigan yesterday, it may not be a coincidence that NPR today ran this story on the first-gen college experience at Michigan.  The headline plays up "rural," however:  "'Going to Office Hours is Terrifying, and Other Tales of Rural Students in College." Here's an excerpt from Elissa Nadworny's long feature that reflects another theme of the story--the similarities of first-gen students, even across racial boundaries:
Two students share a laptop in the atrium of the chemistry building at the University of Michigan. One, Cameron Russell, is white, a freshman from a rice-growing parish in Louisiana; the other, Elijah Taylor, is black, a senior and a native of Detroit. 
They are different, yes, but there is much that unites them. 
Both are the first in their families to go to a four-year college, a tough road Taylor has already traveled. Now he's serving as a mentor to Russell, whose rural background brings with it struggles that only a tiny handful of universities, including this one, are beginning to acknowledge and address.
* * *
Taylor says neither student can "call home and say, 'Mom, how do I navigate the college experience?' "
Then there is the part of the story that focuses on rural, and acknowledges the difference that the 2016 election has made to the amount of attention paid to the rural sector:
Many colleges and universities were caught by surprise when frustration among rural Americans spilled over into national politics during the 2016 election. That, in addition to steady declines in enrollment, has pushed some schools to pay more attention to rural students — and to recognize that these students need at least as much help navigating the college experience as low-income, first-generation racial and ethnic minorities from inner cities.
Again, this focuses on what low-income students have in common, not that which divides them.  I sure wish we saw more of this sort of hopeful, cross-racial bridge building.  There's lots more in this story about rural students and their particular struggle.  It features students from Au Gres, Michigan, population 889; Charlotte, Michigan, population 9,074; Lake Linden, Michigan, population 1,007 on the Upper Peninsula; and an specified town near Holland, Michigan, in the western part of the state.  All of these students from places that are rural to one degree or another are fascinating to me, perhaps especially Kendra Beaudoin, the eldest of five children raised by a single mom in Michigan's UP:
"I'm still intimidated by professors. Going to office hours is terrifying," she says. "There were definitely moments when I was like, 'I'm only going here to fill a diversity quota and I don't really belong here and everybody else is so much smarter than me.' "

Other obstacles are more mundane. Take crosswalks. "Those don't exist where I lived," Beaudoin says. She stops and waits for the light to change while other pedestrians brush past her. When her phone broke, leaving her without one for several months, she used a paper map to find her way around campus. She still has trouble figuring out the bus system. Yet, as someone from a rural place where self-sufficiency is valued, "The idea of going to someone and asking how this works ... it was almost like I felt bad for not knowing."
The story also includes information about the University of Georgia, Lycoming College in Williamsport, Pennsylvania, and Appalachian State University in North Carolina.  And it pays a lot of attention to class, including this quote from a first-gen, rural student:
"Everybody else has got the coin that I don't have. Those Canada Goose jackets? You're kidding," Schwiderson says, referring to the brand of parkas other Michigan students wear, which can cost up to $1,550. "I'm walking down the road and I see people with Gucci or Versace."
The NPR feature continues:
Students say they're acutely aware of the socioeconomic divide at the University of Michigan, where the median family income of students is $156,000, or three times the state average, according to the Harvard-based think tank Opportunity Insights. Ten percent come from families in the top 1 percent of earners, and only 16 percent from the bottom 60 percent.
Sadly this NPR piece also suggests the rural brain drain--that is, it features students who don't want to go back to their rural home towns--at least not any time soon, and sometimes not even for the holidays.  One reason for that is political differences the students have with those in their home communities.  The story also tends to confirm negative stereotypes about rural places as racist and intolerant, and it certainly confirms that many assume rural folks to be racist and intolerant.

Another higher education story that implicates class ran last week, also part of NPR's series, The Changing Face of College.  It's about how top colleges, including Princeton University, are taking transfer students for the first time in decades, including transfers from community colleges.  Elissa Nadworny also reports this story:
In reinstating the school's transfer program, they wanted to encourage applicants from low-income families, the military and from community colleges. 
It's a part of the wave of attempts by elite schools to diversify their campuses. Just 3 percent of enrollment at these top colleges are students from low-income students. And a proven ground for recruiting smart, low-income students is through transfers, especially from community colleges. 
Nadworny quotes Keith Shaw, the director of Princeton's transfer, veteran and non-traditional student programs, regarding these populations. 
They're bringing perspectives out of their experience that would otherwise be lacking here.
Of the thirteen offered admission last fall, nine accepted.  They included military veterans, older students, and students with young families.  More from Shaw:
It's not like you admit nine students, and it's suddenly wildly changed the campus culture. [But, having those students on campus] goes a long way towards changing the campus culture and making it a little bit more reflective of the broader American public that it's drawing on.
This story also discusses efforts at Amherst, long a leader in efforts to achieve greater socioeconomic diversity.

Finally, this in the New York Times by Jennifer Medina and Jill Cowen talks about the first-gen experience at University of California, Irvine.  And this is a story from last month that talks about "when the wheels start to come off" at Thanksgiving, meaning students often start to think about giving up on college near the end of their first semester or quarter.  

Wednesday, December 12, 2018

Affirmative action for new minority group: white males

According to a recent Newsweek article, being a white male might put a college applicant at an advantage, but not the one that you might think. Apparently, white males are now considered a minority group among British universities. Statistics show that white men are underrepresented at approximately 10% of all higher education institutions in the United Kingdom—especially in fields of business and science where ethnic minority groups make up 70% of students. In response, the University of Essex and the University of Aston have announced plans to recruit more white men, putting them on a par with Black students and women engineers.

Aston and Essex's initiatives controversially follow a September warning by the Office for Students (which regulates British universities) that:
Institutions could be punished unless they give a higher proportion of top degrees to Black students,
The Telegraph reports. Despite the warning, Aston and Essex still found white male representation to be lacking in their institutions. The colleges relied on research published by the Higher Education Policy Institute which also indicated that more needs to be done to encourage young white males to apply for college, according to the Atlanta Black Star.

Notably, these statistics do not account for the class of the underrepresented men, only their race. However, Oxford University does intend to consider class status in a new initiative. The world renowned institution has introduced a plan to recruit specifically white men of working-class backgrounds. This too is subject to controversy since Oxford was accused of "Social Apartheid" last year after data showed 10 of its 32 colleges failed to admit a single qualified Black student with Advanced Levels or A–levels (a secondary school qualification).

Recent research indicates that some university staff have mixed reactions to recruitment schemes aimed specifically at white males because they fear the programs may lead to accusations of racism on the part of admissions offices, The Telegraph reports.

For example, a 2016 study led by education and youth development group LKMco (King's College of London) stated that, in response to initiatives addressing the underrepresentation of white working-class boys in higher education,
We found that people were quite uncomfortable with the idea of running a targeted activity with this group, in a way that we've not encountered, for example, targeting young black African men.
The low number of white males applying for colleges is an issue not unique to the United Kingdom. In America, too, males are enrolling in college at alarmingly low rates, according to The Atlantic. By 2026, the U.S. Department of Education estimates that 57% of college students will be women. The feminist in me wants to see this as a good thing—more women and less white men becoming educated might shift the current power dynamic over time. But, I think this statistic (and the United Kingdom studies) identifies a larger issue: working-class white males' aversion to education. This aversion must be addressed since better educated voters should result in better policy and (hopefully) more rationality.

American universities could address the decrease in WWC enrollment in a similar fashion as Aston, Essex, or Oxford. However, such an initiative would likely be met with skepticism in the United States—especially if the plan focused solely on recruiting white men without attention to class. Americans (myself included) probably question whether the dwindling numbers of white males in business and science is even really an issue. Wasn't attracting more women and people of color—and therefore fewer white men—the goal of affirmative action programs in the first place? Even so, people are quick to forget that working-class whites from rural communities face crippling disadvantages in pursuing education. Yet, the WWC is left out of racially-based affirmative action programs which purport to level the college application playing field. Are class-disadvantaged white applicants entitled to affirmative action? Or will they prosper because "if you're white, you'll be alright"?

White male privilege appears to be rampant in the United States where white males, quite literally, control the government and most major corporations. So, the belief that white men will be successful simply based on the color of their skin is somewhat understandable. But, as this course has illustrated, working-class white men are underrepresented in all facets of prestigious modern life—especially in elite education. I posit that it is time to abandon the traditional notion of white privilege when applied to the WWC. In the context of higher education, universities must consider an applicant's socio-economic background rather than racial-minority status alone if the educational system is to be improved and diversified. That, or, expand affirmative action programs to assist a new minority group: the white working class. 

Economic anxiety is central to the white working classes attraction to populism

In Joan C. Williams recent article, she posits:
Many decent, sensible people voted for Trump because they believed that neither the Democrats nor the Republicans had stopped the downward spiral of the middle class.
Economics can help explain much of the working-class's support of Trump, and on a grander scale the swing to populism in America, as well as in many other developed countries globally (see commentary on the collapse of established political parties in France, or the rise of the Five Star Movement in Italy here, here, and here).

First, what does it mean to be a populist? The underlying characteristics of populism are an ideology that pits a good and moral population against a corrupt elite. This ideology then takes on many moving parts like socialism, nationalism, or anti-imperialism to explain the world around them and to justify specific agendas. For example, in Poland a religious-nationalist populist, Mr. Kaczynski, pushes for a Catholic takeover of the country's institutions from the elite secular liberals. In Netherlands, Mr. Wilders, is demanding a crackdown on the "Islamization" of Europe in defense of women's rights and LGBT rights. In Spain, Podemos - a socialist populist party, is aiming to seize vacant buildings owned by banks and distribute them to the poor while attacking the elite groups.

In America, populism means a division of a virtuous general population against corrupt elites that constrain the will of the people. On the right, this can also be spun as the people, including the white working class, against certain ethnicities identified as foreigners who are thought to be the enemy (Latin Americans and Middle Easterners). So why have these sets of ideas become increasingly potent and prevalent in American politics?

The economic pain of blue collar voters - largely the white working class - can illustrate the populist movement in the United States. Following the Great Recession, citizens experienced many economic struggles. Unemployment skyrocketed and entire job markets were lost. Journalists have found that some companies used the recession as an opportunity to fire low-skilled workers and replace them with labor-saving machines. The financial crisis not only shocked the United States financial system, it damaged citizens confidence in the policymaking elites. The people who feel these problems the most are those in the working-class who have not received any "bail-outs" similar to those the largest banking and regulatory institutions did receive.

A Harvard study (by Raj Chetty) documents the sharp decrease in social mobility in recent decades (1940's children broadly out-earned their parents, but only half of those born in the 1980's will). Mr. Chetty finds that this change in mobility is largely a response to automation in factories and the widespread use of computers. Advancements made computers technologies have replaced many jobs that used to be done manually by low-skilled workers. Those jobs are now replaced with a computer engineer, or other high-skilled worker, who uses advanced technological skills to work these technological jobs.  The low-skilled workers remain in labor, but there is a sharp decline available jobs.

Mr. Chetty's study illustrates a wide gap of "middle-class" jobs that have effectively vanished. An increase in international trade has allowed job making companies to offer low-skilled jobs to those who can do the work the cheapest, which often is someone who lives outside of the United States. This results in jobs being outsourced to other countries where the cost of labor is lower. Economic data suggests that outsourcing is good because it is the most cost effective and efficient way to produce goods and services. However, that fails to address the individual citizens concern that there are fewer and fewer jobs in the United States for the low-skilled worker.

The result of both the Great Recession and advancements in computer technology is a large population of working-class people who have been left behind by the elite policy makers of the country. These very real struggles have spurred a populist movement of voters who have aligned themselves with a figure head who has publicly and fervently opposed elite policy makers, President Donald Trump.

There is a need for politicians to discuss the economic issues faced by the populists' opposing the elite policy makers. Trump, however, has used his alignment with the populist movement to further his agenda and maintain a voter base. His rhetoric claims the loss of jobs in America is due to illegal immigration and the "others".  This separates the populist citizens (the good and moral population) against "others" in order to maintain the support of the populist movement. He holds that the failure of the financial system and resulting outsourcing of jobs are the fault of the "policy making elite" or the "swamp" in Washington. Putting the pure and decent population against the "other" is a great and effective fear tactic. Trump expertly fed into these ideas with his drain the swamp and build the wall campaign strategies. Trump and the right even succeeded in goading elite white people into dismissing non-elite white people as racist and ignoring their economic concerns.
All of this creates a populism movement that may have lasting effects for years to come.

The economic concerns of the working-class in America has moved beyond trade and immigration (see commentary in this article) because job losses consistently result from technological advances as opposed to disruption by an "other." As a nation, we should strive to raise skill levels through better education and skills-training programs. This administration seeks to avoid education and give low-skill workers their old jobs back (for example the re-opening of coal mines) without regarding this advance in technology as a driving force. The left has proposed little to combat this problem besides expanding job training at the corporate level. How we decide to cope with the economic woes and the surge of technological advances will dictate how our society responds to the populist movement in the United States.





Tuesday, November 27, 2018

Does Michael Bloomberg's $1.8M gift really help the working-class student?

Michael Bloomberg announced last week that he would be donating $1.8 billion to set up a college financial aid fund at his alma mater, John Hopkins University in Baltimore. His motivation for the unprecedented donation he said, is that "no qualified high school student should ever be barred entrance to a college based on his or her family's bank account." I think we can all agree this is a great gesture, full of generosity, and one we should all be supportive of.  But who, really, will reap the benefits of this donation?

John Hopkins University is a private institution ranked by US News as tenth in the country for undergraduate education. According to Chetty data, private colleges that serve the greatest percentage of low-income students are non-selective universities. Non-selective private universities are those that tend to be the poorest, with few endowments, and they admit most students who apply. At schools such as these, low income students (low income in this data means the lower forty percent of median income) make up roughly a quarter of the student body. On the other end of the spectrum, of highly selective private universities such as John Hopkins, along with even more selective ivy league private universities, the percentage of low-income students plummets to sub ten percent.

The evidence suggests, as does Mr. Bloomberg in his opinion article, that the selective private schools are less likely to admit a student who may have trouble affording the cost of attending, in place of students who can afford to pay. This means that for highly selective private universities, low-income applicants likely only enroll if the admissions team agrees to provide them with scholarships and grants to attend, essentially a full ride. Even though many of these highly selective schools have the funds to provide low-income students a full ride, they often opt for those who can pay full sticker price. This low acceptance rate and outbidding by students coming from wealthy families further discourage low income and working class applicants from applying. Data suggest working-class and low-income applicants will opt for the colleges with the least resources, such as community colleges, regional state schools, or non-selective private universities. Once at these colleges, the lack of cash flow for the college coupled with the lack of present resources means the low-income and working-class student likely will not be afforded the same opportunities, especially as it relates to upward mobility, as are those who attend a selective private university.

Another troubling issue is that most-in-need low-income and working-class students are those at public schools in k-12 that do not have the resources or support to help students achieve their potential. There may be a systemic issue here, in which students with great ability never reach the level of merit described by Mr. Bloomberg in his article. The students who need the most help for upward mobility need the help when preparing for college. Working-class young people realize that they don't have the tools and resources to succeed in college, because they weren't provided those tools or taught how to manage academics in their adolescent lives. In her article in the Atlantic, Alexandria Radford discusses the many reasons working class students with great credentials do not apply to selective private universities. The bulk of the information leads us to the same notion, that working-class students just don't know they can get in to the college of their choice, or that they would be accepted with financial aid available.

Working-class students are not often from schools or cities that have the counselors necessary to advise them. These students often need to be sat down individually to discuss their many options. Often, though, these students only hear about a small number of options available to them through announcements made to their entire class. The majority of high achieving working-class applicants say they just go where they were told to or where they have heard of (the regional public university). I find it hard to believe that such a donation by Mr. Bloomberg will do much for working-class college applicants (except for a few who are the exceptions) and will ultimately allow applicants in the top twentieth percentile to get a better scholarship or even a free ride so that they may further separate themselves from the working class and contribute (even if inadvertently) to the widening of socioeconomic class in the United States.

If Mr. Bloomberg was really interested in serving all applicants who have the merit and high academic credentials to go to an elite college, shouldn't he try to use this money for more than just supporting one of the most selective and exclusive universities in the United States? Why not develop a national scholarship fund that can support working-class applicants who wish to attend a multitude of different universities based on need? Do we want to see one of the largest gifts ever made go to a top-ten selective university that already can provide all of their students with need based financial aid? I am happy that a successful business mogul is announcing to the world that our education system needs help and reform, and his actions are admirable, but are they really accomplishing the goals that he claims catalyzed his donation in the first place?

On population density and election outcomes (oh, and race)

Both the New York Times and National Public Radio are reporting today on the impact of suburban voters in recent elections.  In short, suburban voters are moving to the left, but their positions are often contradictory, and recent shifts are certainly no guarantee suburban voters will stay left.  The primary axis of analysis for these stories is population density, though the NYTimes pieces attends to race secondarily.

The New York Times Upshot feature leads with the big news out of Orange County, California in the 2018 mid-term elections:  no part of the county will be represented by a Republican congressperson in the coming session, and it's the first time that's happened since 1940.

The NYTimes quotes Lily Geismer, a historian at Claremont McKenna College in California:
There is this idea that if all these suburban areas are blue, that will mean they’re automatically more progressive.
Geismer suggests that phenomenon is "an indication of something more progressive, she said, but underneath are “still commitments to a lot of kinds of inequality.”  The story provides these specific examples: 
[F]urther down the ballot in Orange County, voters also considered several propositions meant to ease the state’s housing crisis. Orange County voters opposed a bond to fund housing assistance programs, which passed statewide. And they rejected a rent-control measure by a wider margin than the rest of the state (the measure failed).
Thus, the New York Times concludes, "Newly Democratic Orange County is not exactly on its way to becoming liberal San Francisco."
[Geismer's] research on suburban Democrats identified many who supported liberal agendas in Washington while opposing affordable housing or school desegregation in their own communities. That dissonance reflects the particular politics of many suburban communities — politics that have made them a national battleground.
This reminds me of Edsall's piece, "The Democrats' Gentrification Problem" and David Brooks' recent piece, "The Rich White Civil War." 

The NPR story breaks things down region by region, focuses on suburban seats that flipped across the nation, including suburbs of Atlanta, Memphis, Denver, Oklahoma City, Minneapolis, Chicago, Rochester, Jacksonville, San Bernardino County, Austin and Houston, among others.  Both stories feature some cool maps/infographics, and those are well worth a look.  The New York Times infographic breaks the analysis into six categories of places (as designated by CityLab) based on population density:  rural, rural-suburban, sparse suburban, dense suburban, urban-suburban, and urban.  The Times observes:   
After this election, there are no truly urban congressional districts represented by Republicans in Congress. The last and only one to flip was New York’s 11th, covering Staten Island and part of southern Brooklyn. Florida’s 25th, west of Miami, is the densest Republican district left.
And rural areas, the Times concludes, are now reliably Republican.  As for me, I'm still not sure why that is so--is it stasis and tradition? economic threat?   The story says rural voters focus on "individualism and limited government," which is certainly the stereotype.

The New York Times story mentions race only a few times--specifically, whiteness:
... changing nature of the suburbs and the changing preferences of white college-educated voters there who are repelled by the president.
... many highly educated, white suburban voters disagree with the Republican Party than the economic issues on which they’re better aligned.
The last paragraph of the story mentions "rural communities and white working-class voters" as similar, if not synonymous.

The story references minorities--presumably racial/ethnic minorities--twice:
.... as long as Republicans continue to seem uninterested in courting minorities...
and observing that well-off suburban voters' economic interests
simply aren’t aligned with poorer, minority Democratic voters who want more affordable housing, integrated schools or services funded by higher taxes. 
A NYTimes story about the health (or lack thereof) of the Democratic party in the American Midwest is here.

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism.  

Monday, November 26, 2018

Is the white working class responsible for Trump?

Political journalists and academic scholars alike have continued to discuss the role of the white working class in the 2016 election of Donald Trump. Yet a close look at statistical evidence suggests that this discussion may be politically motivated.

Let us begin with a discussion about the income of white Trump voters in the 2016 presidential election. The median household income of a Trump voter based on census bureau data is about $72,000, which is above the national household median income of about $56,000. Looking to the American National Election Studies data from November 2016,  we can further analyze who voted for Trump among different income levels.

First let us examine statistical results of only the white voters. Among white voters without a college education, Trump secured a greater percentage of votes for all income levels. Among white, college educated voters, Clinton secured more votes than Trump (and by a vast majority in the top 20% of income).

Next we turn to results for all respondents regardless of race. Among all college educated voters, Clinton surpassed votes for Trump modestly. Among all voters without a college education, those in the lower 80% of income gave Clinton more votes than Trump by narrow margins. However, the top 20% income group voted in favor of Trump by only a slight margin.

This data suggests that the election of Trump was not a result of the white working class, but a result of all economic class levels of white voters who do not have a college level education (see data analysis here), and a good number who do.

I feel this requires liberal media and all those who are frustrated with the election of Trump to recognize the factors that are at work here. The definition of white working class is still fuzzy and may take on several forms. For example, if we use a definition of the white working class as all white people who do not have a college education, which many have suggested before me, than the data does prove that the white working class elected Trump. However, I would not only look to lacking college education when describing the white working class, but also some level of blue collar, labor type working status in occupation. If such criteria is used, the white working class did not elect Trump, rather white voters of all types elected him. Furthermore, in this respect, not more than half of the white working class even voted. We might say that the white working class is more likely to abstain than to vote for Trump. But, then, they tend to abstain generally. 

Looking then to economic classes, we start to see a different story. For example, the American National Election reports that nearly sixty percent of white Trump supporters without college degrees are in the top half of the income distribution. In fact one in five Trump voters without a college degree live in households where income exceeds $100,000. Duke University Professor Nicholas Carnes and Vanderbilt University professor Noam Lupu wrote in their recent article (here) that media often refers to the education gap as poor people rushing to vote for Trump. In reality, many of the people without college degrees who voted for Trump were from middle and high income households. They refer to this as the basic problem when using education to measure the working class. The short of it is, blue collar workers are the ones perceived when discussing the white working class, but in the story of the 2016 election, they are not the reality. 

If we agree that Trump supporters came from all sections of the white American voter pool, the discussion of white working class among politicians becomes a tool of division. Republican's have used classism to divide and conquer opponents for many years. Here we have a party that deny's climate change, has systematically rolled back protections for workers, rolled back welfare programs and healthcare programs, and then can lead all of the liberals to hate the white working class instead of economic classes similar to their own. It becomes much easier to win over the white, not college educated population when they are being downtrodden by those on the other side (see the first three paragraphs of Joan C. Williams article here). I suggest a refocussing by politicians on the economic woes of the lower economic quartiles as a start to getting back to what the American voter is looking for. A champion of wage growth, job creation, education and healthcare support.


Friday, November 23, 2018

Can we talk about whiteness?

As many readers may know, some of the authors of this blog are law students in the course, “Working Class Whites and the Law.” I have gotten some interesting reactions from people – both those in the legal field and those not – when I tell them I’m in this class. My law student friends have reactions ranging from “How is that class?” with a tone of genuine interest to “How is that class?” with at tone that implies that they expect me to say it’s uncomfortable. The essence of the reaction from my non-legal friends, on the other hand, has been a look of surprise and a question about what on earth we study in the course.

Even more uncomfortably, I got a question about the class in a job interview. On my transcript, this class shows up as “Working Class White.” The interviewer told me that at first he thought that “White” must be the professor’s name, but then he realized that wasn’t right. “Is that actually the name of the class?” he asked me. I attempted to explain the content of the course, but I hadn’t been expecting an interviewer to ask me about the course with such a tone of disbelief, so I was flustered and didn’t do the best job.

It seems that, regardless of the prevalent discussion of working-class whites in the media during election cycles (see this article and this one and this one and this review of another article), our society isn’t comfortable with the idea of academic studies of working-class whites.

Why is this? It could perhaps be because Americans generally aren’t comfortable talking about class. I think it might be more because we aren’t comfortable talking about whiteness.

I was expecting some pushback on this class, but I was expecting it from those who are involved in critical race studies of other races. I thought that there might be the perception that studying whiteness was a perpetuation of privileging whiteness in academic settings. The reactions I’ve gotten, however, haven’t much alleged that issue.

The issue seems to be that a law class called “Working Class Whites and the Law” makes whiteness visible. Several scholars have written about how a part of the system of white supremacy is that whiteness becomes the default. While other races are "seen," whiteness and white culture are taken for granted and become “invisible.”  (See, for example, Critical White Studies (Delgado & Stefancic, eds. 1997)). Making the subject of study in our course explicit necessarily abridges that invisibility, and I think this is what makes people uncomfortable.

This is, in my opinion, a good thing. If even the title of the class on my transcript has the effect of making race visible and disrupting the courses of white privilege, that’s a positive outcome from the course. But selfishly, I wish there were a way to accomplish those objectives with me having to explain in an interview, “Yes, that really is the name of a course I’m taking.”