Showing posts with label employment. Show all posts
Showing posts with label employment. Show all posts

Sunday, November 20, 2022

On working-class white voters in the 2022 midterms

The rural and working-class white voter demographics have garnered considerable attention since the November 9 election.  I'll highlight just a few recent essays and tweets in this post, with a focus on the rural.  

First, there is Robert Kuttner in The American Prospect writing under the headline, "The Rural Turnaround," which begins with some data:   

For decades, Democrats have been losing rural America by ever-worsening margins. If they could perform even 5 percent better in rural counties, the political landscape would be transformed. In the 2022 midterm, Democrats did increase their share of the rural vote in several states, and it’s worth exploring where and why.

After going over the "appalling" recent history, Kuttner gets to what I believe is the most interesting part of the piece: 

My doctoral student at Brandeis, Rachel Steele, has just completed a dissertation on Democrats and rural voters, which will be published as a book. With her permission, I’ll quote a couple of her important insights.

The most important is that Democrats have been losing the white working class, but place acts as an intensifier. If white working-class voters feel abandoned by the economy and disdained by liberal political elites, that is doubly true for working-class rural voters. Their communities as well as their livelihoods have been squandered, and they have had little evidence that Democrats cared. “Place itself has become political,” Steele writes. (emphasis mine)

As late as 2008, according to Steele’s tabulations, 139 rural white working-class counties voted Democratic. By 2016, that fell to six. In 2016, rural white working-class counties favored Trump by a margin of over 51 points. Much of the loss came in the Upper Midwest—Iowa, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota—where national elections and control of Congress are determined.

Steele’s extensive interviews with rural working-class voters also reveal a bitter paradox for Democrats. As good jobs have disappeared, people in communities that once took pride in their self-sufficiency express a broad sense that the work ethic has deteriorated along with the job loss. Instead of crediting Democrats for safety-net programs that save people from destitution, many rural working-class voters, who see their neighbors and their children on the dole, blame Democrats for eroding the work ethic.

IN 2022, THE BEST OF THE DEMOCRATIC CANDIDATES resolved to reverse this syndrome. Just showing up turns out to be hugely important, as a sign of respect and commitment.

John Fetterman’s successful slogan and strategy was “Every County, Every Vote.” Fetterman improved upon Biden’s 2020 rural support by 2.4 percent. According to tabulations by the Daily Yonder, this swing, combined with higher rural turnout for Fetterman, resulted in a net rural gain over Biden of more than 110,000 votes.
The column also talks details of Michigan, Wisconsin and Kansas.  Kuttner cites to his own September piece about the role of rural organizers, a topic I've also taken up on this blog and in my own writing about the Democrats' lackluster effort to win back the rural vote.  
Among the most creative approaches I’ve seen to recruit activists and voters on the ground, especially in rural areas, is a group called Movement Labs, founded in 2017. Movement Labs provides data, technology, and strategy to help grassroots voter mobilization, especially in red and purple states and rural counties that Democrats tend to write off. One of their marquee projects is called Rural Power Lab.

* * *  

Another key insight is that affinity for the Democratic Party may be depressed in many rural areas, but it is far from extinct, and can be rebuilt.

The Nation also published a piece this week on the rural vote.  It's titled "Democrats Must Do Better in Rural America."  Here's an excerpt from the piece by Anthony Flaccavento, Erica Etelson and Cody Lonning:  

Rural races are different from urban and suburban races; running competitively in them requires a different approach in both style and substance. Two-thirds of rural voters hold Democrats in low esteem and are profoundly antagonized by liberal elites who scorn the “rubes of flyover country.” Though Democrats’ rural deficit runs deep, it’s important to remember that as recently as 2008, Barack Obama garnered 43 percent of rural votes. And this cycle, John Fetterman’s consistent presence in rural places produced a two-and-a-half-point improvement over the 2020 presidential race—enough for him to win statewide in Pennsylvania.

“Can Democrats Succeed in Rural America?” describes more than a dozen strategies used by rural candidates and office holders, four of which we highlight here.
First, candidates must have local credibility. Whether through generational ties to the area or long-standing community involvement and problem solving, Democrats fare better when they have local roots and are fluent in the concerns and values of the people living there.

Second, candidates put local concerns and issues first, rather than trying to mobilize people around their own—or their party’s—policy agenda. ...[I]t means respecting voters enough to put their priorities at the center of the campaign. In so doing, candidates sometimes find meaningful ways to tackle state and national issues by drawing upon local experience, as when a candidate in rural Appalachia stood up for local businesses by fighting the outrageous subsidies used to recruit big box competitors.

Third, candidates and campaigns seek people where they are, rather than strictly following the advice to “go where the votes are.” Canvassing and phone-banking strategies typically focus on people who vote regularly and lean Democrat. By contrast, many of our study’s successful candidates reached out to people usually overlooked by campaigns.

Fourth, successful candidates listen more and talk less.
Fetterman’s victory might be uniquely instructive. He defeated a candidate, Mehmet Oz, who was conventionally stronger than those other Democrats’ opponents. 

* * *  

How this happened is illustrated by the [American Communities Project] data. Fetterman significantly reduced his opponent’s margins of victory — relative to Biden’s 2020 performance against Trump — in three types of counties where Trump has done extraordinarily well.

In the ACP’s taxonomy, those three county types are known as the Middle Suburbs, Working Class Country, and Rural Middle America.

The Middle Suburbs.  These types of suburban counties are Whiter and more working class than your typical inner-ring suburb, which tends to be more diverse, cosmopolitan and professional.

We often think of the suburbs as anti-Trump, but his large margins in Middle Suburbs across the country were key to his 2016 victory.
* * *
In Pennsylvania’s Middle Suburbs, Fetterman limited Oz’s margin of victory to 11 points, significantly down from the 15-point margin Trump racked up in 2020, according to ACP data provided to me.
* * * 
Working Class Country.  These counties are even Whiter than Middle Suburbs and tend to be rural and sparsely populated. They often have low college education rates.

In Pennsylvania’s Working Class Country counties, Fetterman shaved Oz’s margin of victory to 27 points, down from Trump’s 2020 margin of 36 points. Such counties include ones along the state’s northern border or in the southwest corner of the state, abutting West Virginia.

Rural Middle America.  These counties are also rural, but also tend to include a lot of small towns and smaller metro areas. They are somewhat less agriculture-dependent than Working Class Country.

In Pennsylvania’s Rural Middle America counties, Fetterman limited Oz’s gains to 31 points, down from Trump’s 37-point margin in 2020. As Chinni noted, nearly three dozen of these counties are spread throughout Pennsylvania’s vast heartland. 
Meanwhile, Nancy Pelosi, long-time Speaker of the House, has indicated she will no longer seek to be part of the Democratic leadership.  This led to a few Tweets by Matt Barron, a political consultant whose Twitter handle is "Mr. Rural."  You can see these below.  The first is about the likely new house leadership, including Hakeem Jeffries of New York, Katherine Clark of Massachusetts, and Pete Aguilar of California.  

Matt Barron writes:  "So the new House Democratic Leadership will be from NY (45th most-rural state), MA (47th most-rural state) and CA (49th most-rural state).  Democrats really have become the party of the coasts."

The second Barron tweet is about Pelosi's failures:  "Great news.  This is the woman that disbanded the House Democratic Rural Working Group in 2011 and would not enable the creation of a Rural Desk at the DCCC.  Take Hoyer and Clyburn with ya."
 

Meanwhile, the 134 PAC in West Texas has been tweeting about future strategy for rural organizers, here and here:

The first says, "We aren't asking for resources from the central party as they have never provided any.  Our work is to raise the resources ourselves to do what the party does not or cannot do."
The second says:  "The priority for rural Democrats should be to forget about statewide and national elections and focus solely on building up our local organizations and communities."

Lastly, I'll just note that Adam Frisch (D), who ran against Lauren Boebert (R, incumbent) in mostly rural and exurban CO-03 (western and southern parts of the state), has conceded the race to Boebert.  He did so even though he lost by just about 500 votes and was entitled to a recount.  Indeed, NPR is reporting that the recount will go ahead regardless of Frish's concession--and that Frisch has already re-filed to run against Boebert again in 2024.

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism. 

Tuesday, March 1, 2022

On rural resentment and pain, and its link to the trucker strike

I am a huge fan of Thomas Edsall, who writes regularly for the New York Times, but I missed this column earlier this month until today.  The headline is provocative, "There's a Reason Trump Loves the Truckers."  As is typical of Edsall, he marshals recent academic research on a topic.  You have to get pretty deep into this column to get to the rural part of this one, which otherwise focuses on class and regional inequality, but I'm just going to highlight below those rural bits.  The rural bits, by the way, could also be framed as regional inequality.  Edsall writes:  
I asked Rodríguez-Pose whether the truck protests in Canada are a harbinger of future right-wing populist protests, and he pointed to developments in France in his emailed reply:
In France, the phenomenon of the “gilets jaunes” (or yellow vests) is clearly an example of the “revenge of the places that don’t matter.” This is a movement that emerged as a result of a severe hike in diesel taxes in order to pay for the green transition. But this was a decision that many people in small town and rural France felt imposed significant costs on them. These are people who had been encouraged just over a decade before to buy diesel cars and, in the meantime, had seen their public transport — mainly buses and rail lines — decline and/or disappear. Most of them felt this was a decision taken by what they consider an aloof Parisian elite that is, on average, far wealthier than they were and enjoys a world-class public transport system.
The pitting of a populist rural America against a cosmopolitan urban America has deep economic and cultural roots, and this divide has become a staple of contemporary polarization.

“Urban residents are much more likely to have progressive values. This result applies across three categories of values: family values, gender equality and immigration attitudes,” Davide Luca of Cambridge University; Javier Terrero-Davila and Neil Lee, both of the London School of Economics; and Jonas Stein of the Arctic University of Norway write in their January 2022 article “Progressive Cities: Urban-Rural Polarization of Social Values and Economic Development Around the World.”

* * * 
Luca and his colleagues emphasize the divisive role of what Ronald Inglehart, a political scientist at the University of Michigan who died last year, called the “silent revolution” and what Ron Lesthaeghe of the Free University of Brussels describes as the “second demographic transition.”

Citing Inglehart, Luca and his co-authors write:
when people are secure, they focus on postmaterialist goals such as “belonging, esteem and free choice.” The possibility of taking survival for granted “brings cultural changes that make individual autonomy, gender equality and democracy increasingly likely, giving rise to a new type of society that promotes human emancipation on many fronts.”
The urban-rural conflict between postmaterialistic values (shorthand for autonomy, environmental protection, sexual freedom, gender equality) and more traditional values (family obligation, sexual restraint, church, community) is most acute in “high income countries,” they write. This suggests, they continue, “that only more advanced economies can provide cities with the material comfort, and probably the right institutional environment, to make progressive values relevant.”

I'm thinking "postmaterialistic values" sound like what Rob Henderson calls "luxury beliefs"--those that folks with other pressing problems (think Maslow's hierarchy of needs) in their lives solved then have the time to worry and think about. 

In an email, Luca elaborated:
There is a strong correlation between my analyses (and similar lines of research) and trends highlighted in second demographic transition theories. Some of the factors driving the second demographic transition are definitely linked to the development of “self-expression” values, especially among women.
Cities, Luca argued, “are the catalysts for these changes to occur. In other words, cities are the loci where self-expression values can develop, in turn affecting reproductive behaviors and, hence, demographic patterns.”

Social capital is by no means the only glue that holds right-wing movements together.

The Rodríguez-Pose and Luca papers suggest that cultural conflict and regional economic discrepancies also generate powerful political momentum for those seeking to build a “coalition of resentment.” Since the 2016 election of Trump, the Republican Party has focused on that just that kind of Election Day alliance.

Shannon M. Monnat and David L. Brown, sociologists at Syracuse and Cornell, have analyzed the economic and demographic characteristics of counties that sharply increased their vote for Trump in 2016 compared with their support for Mitt Romney in 2012.

In their October 2017 paper “More Than a Rural Revolt: Landscapes of Despair and the 2016 Presidential Election,” Monnat and Brown found that “Trump performed better in counties with more economic distress, worse health, higher drug, alcohol and suicide mortality rates, lower educational attainment and higher marital separation/divorce rates.”

There's so much more to Edsall's column, which I'll try to get to in another post focusing more on class than geography.  

Meanwhile, here's another New York Times column on the Ottawa trucker's strike, this one by Ross Douthat and focused on class.   

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism.  

Monday, June 24, 2019

On "Trump Country" economics in the era of Trump

This post is an effort to collect some of the many recent stories on what's happening economically in the areas associated with high degrees of support for Trump.

Here's Thomas Edsall in the New York Times on April 17, 2019, "If Trump Country Soars, Will the President Glide to a Second Term?"
In small but politically significant ways, the economy under President Trump has favored regions and constituencies that supported him in 2016. These are the men and women whom Trump called forgotten Americans. 
The emerging pattern of economic growth reverses a trend that held from the 2008 recession to 2016, in which Democratic-leaning states and counties far outpaced Republican-leaning sections of the country.
Edsall notes that the more red states than blue ones are setting records for low unemployment.

As a related matter, this May 11, 2019,  New York Times story, dateline Colfax, Wisconsin (population 1,158 or 909, depending on whether you're talking about the village or the town), is headlined "Trump Has a Strong Economy to Proclaim.  In Wisconsin, It Just Might Work."  Here's the lede:
President Trump came to Wisconsin late last month to boast about the state’s unemployment rate, which has been at or near 3 percent for more than a year. “It’s never been this low before. Ever, ever, ever,” he said. (Fact check: true.) 
It’s a message that strikes a chord with Bubba Benson, who lives paycheck to paycheck but says that is still better than where he was a few years ago after getting laid off from a shoe warehouse “when all the jobs went to Mexico.” His new job at a plastics manufacturing plant covers the bills and pays good overtime. There are even a few extra bucks in his paycheck now, which he credits to Mr. Trump’s tax cut.
Journalist Jeremy Peters quotes Benson:
It didn’t let me go out and buy a new house. But that wasn’t what it was for.
The point seems to be that even a slightly improved economy is enough to keep many rural Wisconsin voters on Trump's side.  Many see an economy that is "stable, robust and meaningfully, if marginally, benefiting their lives."  

Jennifer Rubin in the Washington Post on May 1, 2019 wrote "Why Democrats Should Visit Farm Communities."  She quotes a U.S. Dept. of Commerce Report:
A new report confirms that President Trump is causing the most pain in areas of the country that were the most supportive of his 2016 campaign.
Personal income for farmers fell by the most in three years in the first quarter, as losses to U.S. agriculture mount from President Donald Trump’s trade wars.  
The Commerce Department on Monday cited the steep decline in farm proprietors’ income as a key factor weighing on the nation’s overall personal income growth in March, even though agricultural producers represent only about 2 percent of total employed Americans.
That last statistic is true, but the services that support them, the local governments that depend on their tax revenue and the communities in which farmers live feel real economic pain.
Rubin also quotes a Bloomberg report:
One-time subsidy payments from the Trump administration to compensate producers for some of their trade-war losses helped prop up farm income in the previous quarter, but earnings plunged by an annualized $11.8 billion in the January to March period, according to seasonally adjusted data.
Providing a more ambivalent perspective is Sabrina Tavernise, writing for the New York Times on May 27, 2019.  The dateline is Lordstown, Ohio (population 3,272), where a massive General Motors plant closed a few months ago.  The headline is, "With his Job Gone, an Autoworker Wonders, 'What Am I as a Man?'"  Tavernise's story features Rick Marsh, a middle-aged white man who lost his job at the plant when it closed several months ago:
For Mr. Marsh the plant is personal, but in the three months since G.M. stopped making cars there, it has become political. A parade of presidential hopefuls has come through, using the plant to make the point that American capitalism no longer works for ordinary people. 
Tavernise quotes Marsh: 
To me, it’s another flagrant sign that these people, [the political class] really don’t have a clue.  They are so out of touch with reality and real people. All of them.
* * *  
[Marsh] made no exception for Mr. Trump. Mr. Marsh voted for him, as did a majority of voters in Trumbull County, a small square on the map of northeast Ohio that hadn’t voted for a Republican for president since 1972. 
The path to the White House next year runs through places like Lordstown, and Mr. Marsh and many of his neighbors, far from knowing how they will vote, say the G.M. plant shutdown has only left them more at sea politically. They tried voting for Barack Obama, then Mr. Trump.  Now they don’t know where to turn.
This seems promising for those of who would like to see Trump deposed--a critical white, working class perspective on Trump.

And finally here's a March 30, 2019 story from NPR about small-town newspaper editor and Pulitzer Prize winner Art Cullen's role in drawing U.S. presidential candidates to Iowa.   In particular, Cullen seems to be drawing them to his home town, Storm Lake, population 10,600, in the affluent and conservative (Steve King is the representative for the area that includes Storm Lake and surrounding Buena Vista County) northwest part of Iowa.  When the story was written, Cullen was about to host a candidates forum, in which Amy Klobuchar (MN), Elizabeth Warren (MA), Julian Castro (TX), and John Delaney (MD) were committed to participate.  Journalist Clay Masters quotes Cullen "wondering aloud":
Beto? Where's he at? Is he out in Taos or is he dancing with Oprah? Joe Biden? He's trying to make up his mind. Well, why doesn't he come and make up his mind with a bunch of Farmers Union members in Storm Lake? They'll help him make up his mind real good.
Cullen is, of course, not rural America's only erudite advocate, though to read most mainstream media, one would have an opposite impression.  Of course, to read mainstream media, one could also assume that all rural Americans support Trump.  The truth is more complex.

Cross-posted to Legal Ruralism.    

Wednesday, December 12, 2018

Economic anxiety is central to the white working classes attraction to populism

In Joan C. Williams recent article, she posits:
Many decent, sensible people voted for Trump because they believed that neither the Democrats nor the Republicans had stopped the downward spiral of the middle class.
Economics can help explain much of the working-class's support of Trump, and on a grander scale the swing to populism in America, as well as in many other developed countries globally (see commentary on the collapse of established political parties in France, or the rise of the Five Star Movement in Italy here, here, and here).

First, what does it mean to be a populist? The underlying characteristics of populism are an ideology that pits a good and moral population against a corrupt elite. This ideology then takes on many moving parts like socialism, nationalism, or anti-imperialism to explain the world around them and to justify specific agendas. For example, in Poland a religious-nationalist populist, Mr. Kaczynski, pushes for a Catholic takeover of the country's institutions from the elite secular liberals. In Netherlands, Mr. Wilders, is demanding a crackdown on the "Islamization" of Europe in defense of women's rights and LGBT rights. In Spain, Podemos - a socialist populist party, is aiming to seize vacant buildings owned by banks and distribute them to the poor while attacking the elite groups.

In America, populism means a division of a virtuous general population against corrupt elites that constrain the will of the people. On the right, this can also be spun as the people, including the white working class, against certain ethnicities identified as foreigners who are thought to be the enemy (Latin Americans and Middle Easterners). So why have these sets of ideas become increasingly potent and prevalent in American politics?

The economic pain of blue collar voters - largely the white working class - can illustrate the populist movement in the United States. Following the Great Recession, citizens experienced many economic struggles. Unemployment skyrocketed and entire job markets were lost. Journalists have found that some companies used the recession as an opportunity to fire low-skilled workers and replace them with labor-saving machines. The financial crisis not only shocked the United States financial system, it damaged citizens confidence in the policymaking elites. The people who feel these problems the most are those in the working-class who have not received any "bail-outs" similar to those the largest banking and regulatory institutions did receive.

A Harvard study (by Raj Chetty) documents the sharp decrease in social mobility in recent decades (1940's children broadly out-earned their parents, but only half of those born in the 1980's will). Mr. Chetty finds that this change in mobility is largely a response to automation in factories and the widespread use of computers. Advancements made computers technologies have replaced many jobs that used to be done manually by low-skilled workers. Those jobs are now replaced with a computer engineer, or other high-skilled worker, who uses advanced technological skills to work these technological jobs.  The low-skilled workers remain in labor, but there is a sharp decline available jobs.

Mr. Chetty's study illustrates a wide gap of "middle-class" jobs that have effectively vanished. An increase in international trade has allowed job making companies to offer low-skilled jobs to those who can do the work the cheapest, which often is someone who lives outside of the United States. This results in jobs being outsourced to other countries where the cost of labor is lower. Economic data suggests that outsourcing is good because it is the most cost effective and efficient way to produce goods and services. However, that fails to address the individual citizens concern that there are fewer and fewer jobs in the United States for the low-skilled worker.

The result of both the Great Recession and advancements in computer technology is a large population of working-class people who have been left behind by the elite policy makers of the country. These very real struggles have spurred a populist movement of voters who have aligned themselves with a figure head who has publicly and fervently opposed elite policy makers, President Donald Trump.

There is a need for politicians to discuss the economic issues faced by the populists' opposing the elite policy makers. Trump, however, has used his alignment with the populist movement to further his agenda and maintain a voter base. His rhetoric claims the loss of jobs in America is due to illegal immigration and the "others".  This separates the populist citizens (the good and moral population) against "others" in order to maintain the support of the populist movement. He holds that the failure of the financial system and resulting outsourcing of jobs are the fault of the "policy making elite" or the "swamp" in Washington. Putting the pure and decent population against the "other" is a great and effective fear tactic. Trump expertly fed into these ideas with his drain the swamp and build the wall campaign strategies. Trump and the right even succeeded in goading elite white people into dismissing non-elite white people as racist and ignoring their economic concerns.
All of this creates a populism movement that may have lasting effects for years to come.

The economic concerns of the working-class in America has moved beyond trade and immigration (see commentary in this article) because job losses consistently result from technological advances as opposed to disruption by an "other." As a nation, we should strive to raise skill levels through better education and skills-training programs. This administration seeks to avoid education and give low-skill workers their old jobs back (for example the re-opening of coal mines) without regarding this advance in technology as a driving force. The left has proposed little to combat this problem besides expanding job training at the corporate level. How we decide to cope with the economic woes and the surge of technological advances will dictate how our society responds to the populist movement in the United States.





Monday, November 26, 2018

Is the white working class responsible for Trump?

Political journalists and academic scholars alike have continued to discuss the role of the white working class in the 2016 election of Donald Trump. Yet a close look at statistical evidence suggests that this discussion may be politically motivated.

Let us begin with a discussion about the income of white Trump voters in the 2016 presidential election. The median household income of a Trump voter based on census bureau data is about $72,000, which is above the national household median income of about $56,000. Looking to the American National Election Studies data from November 2016,  we can further analyze who voted for Trump among different income levels.

First let us examine statistical results of only the white voters. Among white voters without a college education, Trump secured a greater percentage of votes for all income levels. Among white, college educated voters, Clinton secured more votes than Trump (and by a vast majority in the top 20% of income).

Next we turn to results for all respondents regardless of race. Among all college educated voters, Clinton surpassed votes for Trump modestly. Among all voters without a college education, those in the lower 80% of income gave Clinton more votes than Trump by narrow margins. However, the top 20% income group voted in favor of Trump by only a slight margin.

This data suggests that the election of Trump was not a result of the white working class, but a result of all economic class levels of white voters who do not have a college level education (see data analysis here), and a good number who do.

I feel this requires liberal media and all those who are frustrated with the election of Trump to recognize the factors that are at work here. The definition of white working class is still fuzzy and may take on several forms. For example, if we use a definition of the white working class as all white people who do not have a college education, which many have suggested before me, than the data does prove that the white working class elected Trump. However, I would not only look to lacking college education when describing the white working class, but also some level of blue collar, labor type working status in occupation. If such criteria is used, the white working class did not elect Trump, rather white voters of all types elected him. Furthermore, in this respect, not more than half of the white working class even voted. We might say that the white working class is more likely to abstain than to vote for Trump. But, then, they tend to abstain generally. 

Looking then to economic classes, we start to see a different story. For example, the American National Election reports that nearly sixty percent of white Trump supporters without college degrees are in the top half of the income distribution. In fact one in five Trump voters without a college degree live in households where income exceeds $100,000. Duke University Professor Nicholas Carnes and Vanderbilt University professor Noam Lupu wrote in their recent article (here) that media often refers to the education gap as poor people rushing to vote for Trump. In reality, many of the people without college degrees who voted for Trump were from middle and high income households. They refer to this as the basic problem when using education to measure the working class. The short of it is, blue collar workers are the ones perceived when discussing the white working class, but in the story of the 2016 election, they are not the reality. 

If we agree that Trump supporters came from all sections of the white American voter pool, the discussion of white working class among politicians becomes a tool of division. Republican's have used classism to divide and conquer opponents for many years. Here we have a party that deny's climate change, has systematically rolled back protections for workers, rolled back welfare programs and healthcare programs, and then can lead all of the liberals to hate the white working class instead of economic classes similar to their own. It becomes much easier to win over the white, not college educated population when they are being downtrodden by those on the other side (see the first three paragraphs of Joan C. Williams article here). I suggest a refocussing by politicians on the economic woes of the lower economic quartiles as a start to getting back to what the American voter is looking for. A champion of wage growth, job creation, education and healthcare support.


Friday, November 23, 2018

Can we talk about whiteness?

As many readers may know, some of the authors of this blog are law students in the course, “Working Class Whites and the Law.” I have gotten some interesting reactions from people – both those in the legal field and those not – when I tell them I’m in this class. My law student friends have reactions ranging from “How is that class?” with a tone of genuine interest to “How is that class?” with at tone that implies that they expect me to say it’s uncomfortable. The essence of the reaction from my non-legal friends, on the other hand, has been a look of surprise and a question about what on earth we study in the course.

Even more uncomfortably, I got a question about the class in a job interview. On my transcript, this class shows up as “Working Class White.” The interviewer told me that at first he thought that “White” must be the professor’s name, but then he realized that wasn’t right. “Is that actually the name of the class?” he asked me. I attempted to explain the content of the course, but I hadn’t been expecting an interviewer to ask me about the course with such a tone of disbelief, so I was flustered and didn’t do the best job.

It seems that, regardless of the prevalent discussion of working-class whites in the media during election cycles (see this article and this one and this one and this review of another article), our society isn’t comfortable with the idea of academic studies of working-class whites.

Why is this? It could perhaps be because Americans generally aren’t comfortable talking about class. I think it might be more because we aren’t comfortable talking about whiteness.

I was expecting some pushback on this class, but I was expecting it from those who are involved in critical race studies of other races. I thought that there might be the perception that studying whiteness was a perpetuation of privileging whiteness in academic settings. The reactions I’ve gotten, however, haven’t much alleged that issue.

The issue seems to be that a law class called “Working Class Whites and the Law” makes whiteness visible. Several scholars have written about how a part of the system of white supremacy is that whiteness becomes the default. While other races are "seen," whiteness and white culture are taken for granted and become “invisible.”  (See, for example, Critical White Studies (Delgado & Stefancic, eds. 1997)). Making the subject of study in our course explicit necessarily abridges that invisibility, and I think this is what makes people uncomfortable.

This is, in my opinion, a good thing. If even the title of the class on my transcript has the effect of making race visible and disrupting the courses of white privilege, that’s a positive outcome from the course. But selfishly, I wish there were a way to accomplish those objectives with me having to explain in an interview, “Yes, that really is the name of a course I’m taking.”

Tuesday, October 30, 2018

A perspective on immigration and the white working class

President Donald Trump has often offered rhetoric opposing immigration and calling for a tightening of laws against immigration to the United States of America. Most recently, Trump has escalated his attacks on a migrant caravan originating in Central America and making its way through Mexico  towards the United States. Trump has declared the situation a national emergency and insisted that "criminals and unknown Middle Easterners are mixed in." Reports from journalists familiar with the caravan have concluded that Trump's assertion is not substantiated by any evidence, and that the caravan consists of families wishing to escape violence and turmoil in Honduras and Nicaragua.

The call for a tightening of immigration laws may be a tactic by Trump to stoke fear and anger in his voting base before the upcoming November midterm elections. Regardless of Trump's tactics, however dubious they may be, the issue of immigration may explain more about the current plight of the white working class (WWC) than found at fist glance. In a recent interview, (that can be found here) Marisa Abrajano, a professor of political science at the University of California, San Diego, posits a theory that the WWC may feel three distinct threats to their livelihood. First, a cultural threat, exemplified by a commentator saying "if you don't speak english and don't contribute, get out." Second, an economic threat, outlined by fear of joblessness and the familiar idea that immigrants are "stealing jobs" from the ordinary WWC citizen. Third, a political threat, which can be explained as the difficulty in comprehending policies that pose a threat to the WWC and to the country regarding immigration.

The threats perceived by the WWC are not without merit, but may be overstated through politcal rhetoric. A changing culture may create fear of loss and security to all classes and racial groups alike. The New York Times article "Trump's 'Purple' Family Values" helps to explain this commonly perceived threat. Many of the WWC identify closely with their family values and see change and interruption as a threat. Cultural identities are deeply rooted in generations of family values and religion. Immigrants arrive with differing religious beliefs and values, but should not be seen as an outright threat to the WWC as some rhetoric may suggest. In many respects, this is opportunity to learn through diversity and to create growth throughout the country. The fact of the matter is that legal immigrants will continue to come to the United States and change the cultural makeup of all areas in the country. This may be a fear to some, but should be put into perspective that culture evolves continuously and can be beneficial rather than threatening.

The threat of economic woes may be more precarious. Economists have long supported immigration and offered evidence that immigration often boosts native-born Americans up the economic ladder. Immigrant workers often contribute to the lowest rungs of jobs on the economic latter, and provide opportunity for upward mobility to current working class citizens. The economic reality is that immigration boosts supply in the work force with new unskilled laborers who can create growth in many markets as the labor force. Additionally, immigrant workers increase demand in the economy because they become consumers that American workers can turn into customers. This is not to say the some in the WWC may lose jobs to immigrant unskilled laborers. Although, the current economic climate does little to justify such fears. The United States boasts some of the lowest unemployment rates in history. Is it possible that an immigration fueled economic threat is largely a political and rhetorical tactic to divide the voting population rather than to disseminate factual information to voters? I am sure arguments can be made for either side, but the WWC appears to be the most susceptible voting group to perceive this as a real if not already present threat to their livelihood, regardless of evidence to support this threat.

The political threat to the WWC may be the most pronounced in today's media and voting trends. With a partisan government, the Republican party has clearly been responding more to the plight of the WWC voter when concerns regarding immigration arise. The Republicans are able to capture the multiple factors and threats affecting the WWC, build a centralized theme around those factors and mobilize voters to their side. Examples include the "build a wall" movement, and the consistent rhetoric regarding "boarder security." The Democratic party, although dominating the vote of minority groups in the United States, have failed to create a centralized theme that can bring voters together, especially when concerning the WWC voter and immigration.

This partisan divide has only further opened the Democratic and Republican fissure on the issue of immigration. The recent news story of an Iowan murder victim and her family from a WWC background quickly spread because the assailant was an immigrant. Some conservative voices on social media quickly latched on to this story. They created a spectacle around immigration and boasted white nationalist ideals. The victim's family called for a stop to the media comments, saying in an interview:
Our family has been blessed to be surrounded by love, friendship, and support throughout this entire ordeal by friends from all different nations and races. Commenters do not get use use this to inaccurately promote your 'permanently separated' hyperbole.
Furthermore, the article expounds that in a highly rural and working class community, the unemployment rate is only 2.5% and "it would be hard to argue that immigrants were 'stealing' native-born American's jobs. The problem of low, stagnant wages is one Trump has yet to address."

It is widely evident that the WWC and many outside the top 20% are experiencing wage stagnation. This economic woe may explain some of the fear of immigrant fueled economic threat. Still, correlation between immigration and the economic woes of the WWC are largely unsubstantiated, and have often been proven to the contrary by economists. Studies have shown that immigrants actually have lower crime rates than native-born citizens. This could suggest that Trump and his rhetoric may be useful only to stoke fear in the hearts of the WWC to vote Republican. Regardless of Trump's tactics, the Democrats have done a poor job of sending the WWC a comprehensive and centralized message regarding immigration and to put some of the perceived threats of immigration at ease. Although the WWC is struggling to earn a decent wage, the rhetoric regarding immigrants and immigration policy will likely not solve any of their economic woes. Let us hope future policies, whether Democrat or Republican, will address the WWC and the need for wage growth, rather than polarize and divide the voting population.



Friday, October 5, 2018

Do legal employers recruit class diversity?

When employers recruit for “diversity”, what are they looking for? Joan Williams, professor of law at U.C. Hastings, argues that class diversity should be one of the metrics employers pursue. You can read her September 2018 article in the Harvard Business Review here. As I read Williams’ article, I wondered to what extent employers already use class as a measure of beneficial diversity in hiring.

Because I’m a law student, I explored this by analyzing the diversity recruiting posts circulated at my school in the 2017-2018 school year. The law is not known as a particularly diverse profession, and it is becoming aware of the need to address that reputation. Big firms now often offer “diversity fellowships,” “diversity clerkships,” or “diversity scholarships.” These are paid internships at the firm, between the first and second years of law school, that are only available to “diverse” students. There are few other positions available in that first summer which are paid.

If these internships are only available to “diverse” students, how do the firms define diversity? I looked at 25 postings for internships of this type available to me in my first year of law school.

I found three approaches: the first approach was to list categories. This was the dominant mode. Of the 25 listings I analyzed, thirteen used this strategy and all thirteen explicitly mentioned racial or ethnic diversity. Nine discussed sexual orientation or being LGBTQ; seven included disability; seven listed socioeconomic status or economic disadvantage; four mentioned women or gender; two postings touched on religious diversity; two listed veteran status; and one included status as being the first in the family to attend college or purse an advanced degree. Of the seven that listed economic disadvantage, one firm considered that factor as a “boost” to the resume of an otherwise-diverse candidate, not a basis of diversity in and of itself. Finally, six postings included broad, “catch-all” language at the end of their enumerated lists, such as “…or others of diverse backgrounds.”

Is class, then, a category that recruiters seek? It depends on how “class” is defined. Education at the level of less than a college degree is perhaps the most common way to define the working class; by that metric, only one job posting is recruiting students from working-class backgrounds. If class is defined by income or socioeconomic disadvantage, however, class diversity is widely recruited. More than half of job posts listed socioeconomic disadvantage, making it one of the top four traits named. There is still, however, the question of perception: given that race is listed in every post, will white working-class students assume that “diversity” requires racial diversity as a prerequisite? Will they read far enough into the post to see the call for students of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds and believe that they qualify on those grounds?

The second approach was to avoid defining diversity at all. Five posts used this tactic. These five used broad language like “underrepresented in the legal profession.” While this is an accurate description of the goals of diversity recruiting and is inclusive of a wide variety of experiences, it is extremely vague. It doesn’t help a job applicant know if they qualify for the position. Given the prevalence of the first approach, it seems likely that many law students will assume that these undefined listings intend to signal the same categories outlined above, of which race is dominant. Unless class migrants are aware that they qualify as “underrepresented in the legal profession,” believe that the employer will think so as well, and are able to articulate that with confidence, such broad language will not be effective in recruiting class migrants. This is especially true for white class migrants who will not qualify on racial or ethnic grounds.

In the final approach I saw in the job postings, diversity seemed not to reflect who the candidate is but rather what the candidate does. A few firms combined this approach with the enumerated categories described above, but many used this as a stand-alone tactic. A total of ten listings used some form of this tactic. These firms required the candidate to show a “commitment to diversity,” “efforts that promote diversity,” or even “involvement in diversity organizations.” One firm required that the candidate “[p]ossess an understanding of the importance of diversity and inclusion in the legal profession.”

This approach seems unhelpful. Surely the point of having separate “diversity recruitment” is not simply to get people who believe in or work for diversity; that could be accomplished in the normal recruiting process. Moreover, this approach seems likely to work against class migrants. The sorts of organizations that “promote diversity” are normally non-profits which cannot pay their volunteers. People from a working-class background are less likely to have had the option to work without pay and add such organizations to their resume. I also wonder whether there exist sufficient organizations promoting class diversity for such experience to be widespread on the resumes of class migrants.

Based on this limited and admittedly not randomized sample, it seems that Williams is only partially correct, at least as to legal employers. While law firm diversity recruitment does not seem to prioritize class migrants, the firms arguably put some effort towards increasing class diversity. Slightly less than a third of posts discussed socioeconomic disadvantage or listed a background of less education. Personally, however, I am not convinced that, in the context of all the other posts, this recruitment will be as effective in recruiting class migrants as it could be.

Sunday, September 2, 2018

The white supremacist narrative of the North American Free Trade Agreement


Last week, President Trump announced a preliminary bilateral trade agreement with Mexico, making good on one of his campaign promises to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The general consensus seems to be that most of NAFTA will remain in place with some modernizing changes, including new trade rules on auto manufacturing, intellectual property, and labor rights. While the overall wisdoms of the agreement are far beyond my grasp of economic policy, it is interesting to consider why NAFTA has proved to be such a galvanizing issue for Trump’s base. One possible explanation is the white supremacist narrative that frames NAFTA as a concession to foreigners and an active harm towards the white working class.

A persuasive view to many Americans is that more free trade means more globalization, which in turn means less jobs for U.S. workers and more jobs for foreign workers. Adherence to this narrative was particularly strong in the Trump coalition. Among those who agreed that the effect of international trade was to take away U.S. jobs in CNN’s exit polling data, 64% were Trump voters, compared to only 32% of Clinton voters.

However, protectionism alone is race-neutral and enjoys broad support among progressive union-backers and conservative nationalists alike. My theory is that the link between NAFTA and white supremacy* is completed when support for renegotiation of NAFTA becomes an expression of white discomfort with non-white and specifically Mexican immigration and participation in labor markets, a link that is actively supported by President Trump.

One data point that supports this theory is that those who have an unfavorable view of Mexico are much more likely to oppose NAFTA. Only 50% of those who oppose NAFTA have a favorable view of Mexico as opposed to 81% among those who support NAFTA. This data is even more persuasive when one considers that that nine out of ten Americans have a favorable view of Canada, a significantly whiter country, regardless of their support for NAFTA.  

Support for NAFTA also breaks down along racial lines, with 66% of Hispanics and 59% of African-Americans agreeing that NAFTA is good for the U.S., while only 46% of non-Hispanic whites agree. Though a more directed survey and further disaggregation to specifically target the white working class would be helpful, this data indicates that opposition to NAFTA is highly correlated to negative views on Mexico.


Trump also actively panders to white supremacy in his characterizations of NAFTA, by specifically directing criticism towards Mexico and imagining NAFTA as a national humiliation of white America. For example:



In these tweets, Trump intentionally draws a link between NAFTA and unauthorized immigration, even though the connection is tenuous at best. Trump frequently describes NAFTA as being the carrot for the stick of his anti-immigrant policies, such as the border wall. It is also clear that Trump’s opposition to NAFTA is really about Mexico and not white-dominated Canada. Of all of his tweets about NAFTA that singled out a specific country, Trump directed six of them at Mexico, while only one was directed at Canada.

To Trump, NAFTA is a source of national humiliation, and he uses dramatic terms like “disaster”, “devastation”, or “pathetic” to describe the agreement. Although not specifically directed towards NAFTA, Trump also described another trade agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), as a “continuing rape of our country” (emphasis added). Describing free trade agreements with non-white countries as “rape” draws a rhetorical closeness between his dog-whistles on free trade policies with his more patently white supremacist remarks that Mexicans were rapists.

Humiliation and violation of the white race by non-whites and foreigners is a typical narrative pushed by white supremacists in the past. Trump wants his supporters to believe that his political opponents past support of NAFTA was a contribution to the humiliation of America’s white working class and an abdication to Mexico’s dual threats of competition in the labor market and increasing influence in traditionally white-dominated American society. The message is simple: support for NAFTA is a betrayal of the white working class to foreigners, and opposition is a reaffirmation of America as a white country.

To the long suffering white working class, this rhetoric could be appealing because it allows them to place blame squarely upon Mexicans, when the reality of their predicament may very well be that they “died the death of a thousand cuts” due to globalization, weakening of unions, deregulation, deindustrialization, technological development, and many other factors. All this makes one question whether Trump’s statement that there was "no political necessity to keep Canada in the new NAFTA deal" is actually a comment on the negotiations. It may just be that Trump is telling the world that he considers his duty to the white supremacists among his supporters as fully met after he has vanquished his non-white foes in negotiations.

None of this is to say that there are not valid complaints about NAFTA from the white working class that lack any twinge of white supremacy. For example, for the white working class in the auto industry, the update is arguably a welcome change to the shifts in manufacturing that occurred under the original NAFTA, and the United Automobile Workers (UAW) labor union described the negotiations as “on track”.

However, what we should be concerned with is whether white working-class opposition to NAFTA is for principled reasons that have to do with job-growth and a strong economy, or if opposition is influenced by white supremacy and animus towards Mexicans. We all have a special interest in ensuring that our economic policy is guided by sound consideration of  strategy and not white supremacy. A good starting point would be better data that examines this question more significantly as it pertains to the white working class and also more broader recognition of how Trump’s rhetoric is based on white supremacist attitudes.

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* I use the word "white supremacy" because efforts to preserve white supremacy are the reason that the American racial hierarchy persists.